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Just as American politics is pluralistic, American religion is 
pluralistic,, encompassing many sects, denominations, and faiths.
Among the many religious groups, there is a group of politically and 
theologically conservative, protestants that seeks to stop and reverse 
social or political trends through political means. The social, or 
political trends the group perceives may be real or imagined.
Within this group of conservative protestants, there are many 
sub-groups with different leaders, agitating slightly different issues, 
but the sub-groups are united in their political viewpoint: they tend
to look to the past, not the future, as their ideal. This viewpoint 
collides in the political arena with many other groups, especially 
colliding with groups that look, to the future as an ideal.
History is important: to forming an understanding of this group 
of conservative protestants. First, because this group has its view 
of history as an ideal, it is important to understand the group1s 
conceptions and misconceptions of history. Second, history tends to 
show that opposition to conservative religious involvement in politics 
is deeply rooted; many immigrants to this country fled religious- 
political collusion and many, still, tend to react negatively to even 
mild forms of religious involvement in politics.
This study examines some concepts that serve as keys to codifying 
and understandi.tig the political behavior of conservative protestants. 
Further, there is an historical examination of their behavior, and a 
case study of a State Senate race in Norfolk, Virginia, that illuminates 
some of the political limitations placed upon conservative protestants.
POLITICAL PROTESTANTS 
AND
THE CONSERVATIVE SECT
CHAPTER I
THE QUONDAM COMPLEX
"The Quondam Complex describes a preponderance of symbolic
investment in the past, related to some past group identity which has
declined in symbolic importance. The Quondam Complex is politically
actionable in these t e r m s . T h i s  concept, taken from Seymour Martin
Lipset and Earl Raab (The Folitdcs^of Unreason; Right. Wing Extremism
, . 2 ,
in America, 1790-1970 ), is central to this siudv* This study is about
a group of American protestants who feel the course of American politics
should lead back to the way it was— when men supposedly used the Bible
to find their political answers. This group has the past as its guiding
light and reveres the supposedly religious men who colonized America
and wrote its constitution. This group is "conservative” in. the pure
sense of the word as it wants to conserve the past (its conception of
the past) and recapture its perceived former importance as a .group.
The Quondam Complex refers to those on the right wing of American
politics, specifically those who feel their kind used to be in power
but that history passed them by. J. Milton Yinger explained: "One
might say that those on the far right see a glass that is half empty,
and they fear that it soon will be entirely empty unless present trends
3
can be stopped and reversed."' Many right wi.ng groups fit this 
description, including those who feel their economic status, ethnic 
purity, class status,-style-of-life, etc., is ebbing. This study is
about a particular group of protestants who are variously called 
"fundamentalists’’, "evangelicals", "Bible Believers", and so forth., 
who feel moved to take political action to keep the glass from, becoming 
more, empty. Not all fundamentalists are moved to take political 
ac Cion; many confine themselve s L o s a. ving souls and good works. Some 
theologically conservative churches, such as the Catholic and Quaker 
churches, have been involved in "liberal"' political activities (e.g. , 
against: racial discrimination) because they feel the glass was half-full, 
not half-empty. The crucial distinction is that some conservative 
churches took political action to stop or reverse perceived trends.
For the sake of focus, this study will concentrate on the political 
activities of conservative protestant churches.
Sociologists and political scientists use the. term "alienation" 
when explaining protest movements. Yinger described alienation as a 
c o n d i t .1 o n wh e n
"...one experiences the loss 'of a relationship or value...the 
politically alienated feel estranged from the political 
structures and processes that were formerly accepted as 
valuable, means to desired goals. "4
Alienation, thus becomes a motivation to become involved in politics,.
The Quondam Complex provides a basis for political involvement in this
paradigm; A group feels estranged from the political system because of
the disorder, doubt, and decay within the system, and the group decides
(individually or collectively) the best, way to correct the system is to
return, it to traditional standards. The group is then motivated to take
conservative or preservative action.
There, are many forms and styles of political involvement by conserva­
tive churches, from revival-rallies to using church buses to drive the 
flock to the polls. There are many leaders who come and go, many issues
that burn and die out. What remains constant is the tendency of 
conservative protestant churches to protest social changes; these 
churches move into the political arena not to initiate change, but to 
react against it. Because these groups were involved in protest 
activities (a natural occuraiice within Protest-ant churches), they may 
properly be labeled as sects. Bryan Wilson noted the characteristics 
of a sect:
’’Sects are movements of religious protest. Their members 
separate themselves from other men in respect to their, 
religious beliefs, practices, and institutions...They 
respect the authority of orthodox religious leaders, also, 
of the secular government.... Sectarians put their faith 
first: they order their lives in accordance with it.
Each sect must retain its integrity, separating itself from outside
corruption (while still respecting secular government.) Lasswell said
"any sect which becomes tolerant and compromising has ceased to be a
religion and becomes a denomiation. A lack of tolerance and compromise
in a political sphere tends to cause single-issue voting, and rigidity
of doctrine leads to schism.
A label shall be. invented for the groups that engage in political 
activities of a conservative nature as a protest against social change: 
The Conservative Sect. Conservative in that the past is the ideal, 
the light is at the beginning of the tunnel, to change a cliche. It is 
a sect because the group is involved in religious protest. In general 
terms, conservative sect members tend to be fundamentalists on Biblical 
issues, and they relate fundamentalist doctrine to political issues.
The Conservative Sect is a group that draws its political outlook from 
the Quondam Complex because it places na preponderance of symbolic 
investment in the past," and because it feels its identity "has declined 
in symbolic importance”. The Conservative Sect is not a political
party, and only sometimes can it be called a movement. It is a style 
more than a movement, and there are several sub-sects within; it is, 
for the purposes of this study, an amorphous group of American
protestants who -feel both alienation from society and a need to 
regressively change society through political means. This sect has 
been an element of American politics since at least: the early 19th 
century.
Any religious group that gets involved in politics takes certain
risks* By concentrating on political change, instead of changing
people, the conservative sect commits its spiritual strength to the
vagaries of the ballot box. C. G. Campbell argued that the hierarchy
of the Church of England lost its power "by striving to coerce the
Christian conscience to obey its will,vrather than by spiritual means.
The Reverend Carl F. H. Henry argued "the Churchr s mission in the world
is spiritual. Its influence on the political order, therefore, must he
8registered indirectly." Presumably, a religion that changes people
will change the political structure indirectly; a religion that seeks
to change politics directly opens itself up to questions and debate,
A religion risks its reputation if it loses at the polls.
The conservative sect takes a specific risk in its quest to return
American politics to the supposedly religious ways of the founding
fathers. The past is an imperfect guide, as Andrew M. Greely found,
examining the records of the Puritans:
"Just as the conventional wisdom about -religion assumed that 
there was a time when we were more religious... the conventional 
wisdom on marriage assumes that there was a time when chastity, 
fidelity, and monogamy were more popular...One wonders when 
that time was: in Puritan New England, whose ecclesiastical
records recount seemingly endless trials for fornication and 
adultery?"9
It is one thing for a religious group to base its arguments on the
theological grounds, but quite another to base them on historical grounds; 
preachers at home with the Bible are not necessarily competent historians.
Returning to the guidelines set down by the nation's founders can 
provide, a moral anchor, a past record of success to live up to. Returning 
to the religion of Americans forefathers can mean a resurrection of 
the religious beliefs of exclusively male, exclusively white., exclusively 
English protestants. No Catholics, Jews, no Blacks, Poles, Germans, 
Czechs, Slavs, Irish, et al, may contribute. This paradigm excludes 
those forefathers who were non-believers or kept their beliefs to them­
selves. One must assume religious considerations brought the colonists 
and ignore the allure of profit, lack of stulifying caste, and unlimited 
opportunity for adventure. One must further ignore the strong influence 
of the British example (not scriptural example) in the formulation of 
America’s political system. Returning to the religion of .America’s 
forefathers is a rallying cry with historical hyperbole, protestant 
arrogance, and a tincture of racism at its roots.
The Conservative Sect, operating as it does with a Quondam Complex, 
attempts to coerce or at least retrain society through political means 
to move backward. The sect enters politics to change politics, and 
therefore it is important to discover just how much impact it has and 
can have.
This study argues that the Conservative Sect had a significant 
impact only sporadically. Like any political action group, it had to 
be able to first attract voters and second it had to persuade them to 
vote a certain way. Its enthusiastic, fundamentalist preaching attracted 
many but the attraction, was fleeting, primarily because the sect was
led by charismatic leaders who came and went. Unlike a political party, 
the sect had no orderly succession of leaders and no orderly formulation
of policy and doctrine.
Further;, its attempts at persuasion were fraught with errors of 
reasoning,, narrow interpretations of issues, and intransigence. The 
topics for persuasion it selected presented additional problems because 
the sect took up moral issues that were difficult to legislate or 
topics that required the adherent to be against another group: anti-
Catholic, anti-Semitic, anti-feminist, anti-homosexual., anti-anyone 
who was not a politically conservative fundamentalist.
Although there was nothing unconstitutional or unusual about 
religious organizations becoming involved in politics, many currents 
in American history ran counter to such involvement. Many immigrated 
to America to escape repressive state religions, and many came for 
purely secular pursuits. Given the religious pluralism of the country, 
many voters were theologically uncomfortable with the Conservative Sect, 
whether they were among the many who had lacked religious ties or 
among the many who were not fundamentalists. And, given the political 
pluralism of the country, the evangelistic leaders of the Conservetive 
Sect (who saw everything in black-and-white, as good~versus~ev.il) tended 
to be politically naive. Because of these problems in persuasion, the 
Conservative Sect as easily attracted opponents as it did adherents.
In the following chapters, there will be an examination of religious 
involvement in politics, starting with the colonies and ending with 
current involvement, including a case study of a Norfolk, Virginia,
State Senate race in 1979. Tracing historical trends was important for 
two reasons: 'first, history showed the Conservative Sect’s claim that
the founding fathers were guided by religion to be a myth and second, 
it puts current conservative sect involvement in the proper historical 
context, showing that current manifestations of the sect have deep roots.
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CHAPTER II 
THE CONSERVATIVE SECT, TO 1900
The colonists who had a religion were mostly Pro test, ants— protest­
ants in that their religion was formed as a protest to Catholicism. 
Protestants carried in their fiber the schismatic spirit of protest', 
that is, until their sect set up an established denomination, then a 
new generation of protesters broke away:
"Protestantism contained a perverse and rather frightening 
logic which believers tended to back away from whenever they 
saw it, but there was no real escaping it. The process of 
questioning Truth is easier to start then stop, and in a 
questioning atmosphere no. truths are safe,” -
In the 1630s, the Puritans came to America because they felt sure
God* s wrath would strike England as surely as it struck "Sodom and
Gomorrah," and because they felt they were the "successors of Israel.
British politics had turned against them when Charles I installed
William Laud as Archbiship of Canterbury: "Laud’s doctrines, and his
determination to root out dissent, would soon leave the Puritans with
...3
no alternatives, save conformity, silence, emigration, or revo It."
The Puritans protested by emigrating and concerned themselves with
< 4
flaking their society in America embody the Truth they already knew." 
The Massachusetts colony did not become the embodiment of the Puritan 
Truth because the protesting spirit of the Puritans caused the breakup 
of the colony into other colonies "less than five years after the first 
settlers arrived, and the process continued until by the 1640s a whole
9cluster of small New England colonies had come into existence,"J
In 1639 3 Roger Williams formed the first Baptist Church in America-^ 
at Providence and challenged the apparent close interrelationship between 
church, and state, in Massachusetts * Williams saw a clear distinction 
between the two: . ,a law or constitution may be civill or "religious'.. .
either civill (mearly concerning bodies or goods) or religious concerning 
soule and worship. The Puritans did not, in any event, go to the 
Bible for civil law and worried little whether their laws were scriptural,
rather, "that they should be sufficiently English and that any changes
8
in English laws should have ample warrant in local needs.”
The Puritans did invoke the name of God in the official pronounce—
9
irients and. their writings often mentioned churches. This led modern-day 
fundamentalists to conclude that God was a driving force in colonial 
America:
"Statesmen, leaders, and outstanding citizens have indicated 
their faith in God through their public and private statements.
The nation laid its foundation and develo-ped. its political and 
social structure by itcontinued adherence to these spiritual 
and religious ideals."'L
Conservative Sect writers were quick to use history to prove America's
political system was making the glass half-empty; they argued it was
nearly full when the Puritans were in power (and the natural conclusion
is that Americans should return to Puritan ways.) They have said the
Puritans * religious structure was the basis for the American political
system. Daniel J, Boorstin saw it another way:
"Dazzled by the light they found in Scripture, we have failed 
to see the steady illumination found in old English example...
The lawmakers of the colony, to the extent their knowledge 
allowed, and with__ only minor exceptions, actually followed
English e xamp .1 e .'r -~L 1
The Puritan view that the world was evil and corrupt (the half- 
empty glass) made a mark on American Protestantism. Puritans left
another, darker mark, because of their view they were on God's busines
meant "they had a tendency to justify their own conduct even when it 
„12wa s a t r o c 1.0 u s «
Virginia, meantime, "was not founded by religious refugees.
Virginia was set up for economic pursuits, and "the religious doctrine
of the leading Virginians, including George Washington, Thomas Jefferson,
14
Patrick Henry, and James Madison, was non-descript." Modern conserva­
tive sect. writers would refer to the. "founding fathers" and their 
Christian motivations, but one is at a loss to see where the "founding 
fathers" were driven by Christian faith. Other colonies besides 
Massachusetts and Virginia had similar, non-religious reasons for 
existence^  When one refers to the strong religious beliefs of the 
"founding fathers", which fathers is one referring to, and to which 
belief? The Conservative Sect views ignores those who came because 
America offered a better chance for secular pursuits like tilling the 
soil;
"There were also a great many people who belonged to no 
church at all. The secular current in America was always 
strong...the shaping influence of religion in American 
life was itself shaped by the presence of these folk."^6
Purely secular concerns*— an expensive British foreign policy and
the "commercial selfishness of the narrow oligharchy who dominated. . .
17
British affairs"'* — were very important to the colonies, When it came
time to draw up a list of grievances, a Declaration of Independence,
J H
not one complaint dealt with religious affairs... Even the famous 
introduction, "We hold these truths to be self-evident," was edited to 
make it more secular: "In deriving the essential social truths from
their * self-evidence * — rather than from their being ’s.aered .and'-undeni­
able ' as the original draft read— the Declaration was building on
II
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distinctly American Ground.11' The Declaration does mention God and
the Creatory but clearly He. Is mentioned in the sense that He made ail
men equal, and the "self-evident" truths came not from Him, but from
men. *
When the Constitutional Convention met at Philadelphia, its
members were concerned with their half-full glass0 Having thrown off
the British yoke, the constitutionalists had the unique opportunity to
fill the glass, as 11, G . Wells said*
"It was a Western European civilization that had broken free 
from the last traces of Empire and Christendom...The absence 
of any binding religious tie is especially noteworthy— the 
new community bad, in fact, gone, right down to the bare and 
stripped fundamentals of human association."^0
Clinton Rossiter explained that the old church-state relationship was
destroyed, and "the New World pattern of multiplicity, democracy,
private judgment, mutual respect, and. widespread Indifference was Xv7e.ll
.21
on its way to maturity." Edmund S. Morgan said whatever hold the 
church had on the state was lessening, as "eighteenth century Americans 
could talk of the formation of government without even referring to
Israel as their model and sometimes without even mentioning God as an
22
initial participant in the covenant."*~
The constitutionalists were secular men, and they showed political 
toleration for opposing beliefs. Ben Franklin, for one, did not go to
church, but he said, "I was never without some religious principles"—
23
the principles he said he found in all religions. Franklin, in a 
letter to his parents, said virture, not orthodoxy, was most important:
"And the Scripture assures men, that at the last Day, we shall not be.
"? A-examin’d what we thought, but what we d i d . T h o m a s  Jefferson was 
another who talked about toleration by government:
"The legitimate powers of government extend to such arts 
only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury 
for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods or no God. It 
neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.
At the Convention, there was little talk of religion or of God. No
one at the Convention would "have dared to proclaim that his opinion
had the support of the God of Abraham and Paul. The Convention in 1787
26
was highly rationalist and even secular in spirit."
The final document said no thing of God. "We the People of the 
United States" ordained and established this document. There are two 
mentions of religion and both mandate a wide space between religion and 
state. Madison said in Federalist 57, "no qualification of wealth, of 
birth, of religious faith...is permitted to fetter the judgement or 
disappoint the inclination of the people." In Federalist 52, he said 
"the door of [elective offices] of the federal government is open to 
merit of every description...without regard to...any particular profes­
sion of religious faith." MadisonTs explanations of Article Six 
indicated that direct religious involvement in government was prohibited. 
The First Amendment barred the government from getting directly 
involved in religions "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting free exercise thereof."
Clinton Rossiter explained the secular government created by the 
Constitution was the natural product of the need for toleration:
"Live-and-let-live, worship-and-let-worship was the essense 
of religion in this' land of vast differences and a hundred 
religions, of which the most important was the. vaguely 
Christiana rationalism that governed the tolerant minds of 
men like Jefferson, Franklin, Hamilton, and Washington."27
Madison said a. "multiplicity of sects" (Federalist 52) would help secure
religious rights and Jefferson noted "the several sects perform the
office of censor morum over each other," and the unifority sought since
the introduction of Christianity had seen "millions...burned, tortured,
13
fined, imprisoned" and yet "we have not advanced one inch toward 
uniformity. Having many "sects" in the country was thus deemed 
good by the founding fathers, or more accurately, efforts to create one 
sect was deemed, bad for political life. Madison said in his famous 
Federalist 10 one of the "latent causes of faction" was a zeal for 
"different opinions concerning religion", but factions should be 
coutro1 1 ed 5 not s tamped out.
A decade after the Convention, the first identifiable instances 
of conservative sect reaction to social change occurred. A prominent 
Congregationalist minister, Jedidiah Morse, delivered, many sermons 
against the "Order of the Illuminati", a secret masonic society formed 
in Bavaria. The Illuminati were, according to Morse, conspiring to 
overthrow the United States and organised religion. New England 
clergymen and even Yale President Timothy Dwight took, up the torch,
and "illuminism" became a favorite straw-man of the conservative clergy
29
and the Federalists. The Federalists were looking for a convenient 
conspiracy to help rally their crumbling part}/, and other vague, .anti- 
religious, anti-American, and especially pro-French conspiracies were
created. Alleged foreign threats were the reason for the Alien and
. 30 . 1Sedition Acts of: 1789. The Acts were not enforced long— just .Long
enough to interfere with the 1800 elections; two of the three acts
were designed to limit the participation of immigrants who had not only
strange manners, customs, and religions, but also a tendency^ to vote
31
for -Jef f ersonians .
Throughout the 1800s, the Conservative Sect was 'moved to action 
against immigrants. Throughout the century, the Sect was hard at work, 
trying to keep the newly minted Americans from drinking from the glass
14
of American protestant politics. The. immigrants would come and bring
in their baggage any number of icons, symbols, and methods of religion,
and conservative protestants sounded the alarm;
"By 1816 a ’united front’ of American evangelicals...was u
launched to bring merchants, bankers, and clergy together 
in a national effort to make sentimental Protestantism the 
cultural law of the land before T superstitious? Catholics 
and frontier ’barbarians’ had corrupted a vulnerable people."^
To these protestants, the new America was about to die in its infancy
unless the nation retrenched.
But the immigrants were not the sole source of change in the New
World for the natives cared little for the way things used to be done.
H, L. Mencken said, "the generation born in the New World was uncouth
and iconoclastic; the only world it knew was a rough world, and the
virture that environment engendered were not those of niceness, but
33those of enterprise and resourcefulness.” Getting along meant not 
an adherence to hidebound beliefs; it meant getting out and doing and 
inventing new ways of doing things. Being educated was more important
than being devout as "education was his religion, and to it he paid
.34
the tribute of both his money and his affection," The battle between 
the secular and the religious over the proper role of state-run educa- 
ti on began early-on in American history and continues today. The 
Conservative Sect saw education as a powerful secularizing force more 
powerful than the church. Yinger described alienation as "the experienced
loss of a relationship and a sense, of participation and control, with
35
reference to prevailing social s t r u c t u r e s . T h e  immigrants, the 
"uncouth" new generations, secular education, and other developing 
factors were part of the storm surge that further alienated the Conserva­
tive Sect from whatever participation and control of government it once
had..
Feelings of alienation from the political mainstream gorged with 
immigrants spawned many conservative sub-sects. The Know-Nothings 
began organizing in the 1840s, gaining their peculiar name because 
they "knew nothing" when asked about their activities. "It soon became 
evident, howevera that their purposes were to defend Protestantism 
against Catholicism, to make immigration laws more restrictive."”'
By the 1850s aliens constituted more than half the population of New 
York City and they outnumbered native-born Americans in such cities as
o  -j
Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Louis, to name a few.‘ ‘ 'Religious and 
political concerns were also felt by the Whigs, who had drawn on "the
Protestant evangelical animus against Masonry and Catholicism, seen as
38
insidious threats to Protestant republicanism."" Catholic immigrants 
were a natural target because their- .Bible was not the King James Version 
and their allegiance was allegedly to Rome. "Frightened nativists
viewed every Catholic immigrant as an agent, of the pope sent to seize
. . 3 9
the government and destroy Protestantism."
The Quondam Complex Is politically actionable when a group that 
identifies itself with the past feels that events have eroded the sig­
nificance of the group and the Know-Nothings and the Whigs, whose 
importance was waning, began taking on strong characteristics of conser­
vative sectarianism:
"The exposure of subversion was a means of promoting unity 
but it also served to clarify national values and provide 
the ego with...righteousness. Nativists identified them­
selves repeatedly with a strange, incoherent tradition in 
which images of Pilgrams, Minute Men, Founding Fathers, 
and true Christians appeared in a confusing montage.
Larger concerns than immigrants and Catho.loci.sm were drawing the country 
attention by the mid-1850s. The Conservative Sect (anti-Catholic, anti­
immigrant, anti™foreign subversions, etc.) tried and failed to elect a
President (Millard Fillmore) under the banner of the American party in
411856, drawing about twenty-five percent of the total vote.
The election of 1860 brought Lincoln into power and touched off 
the Civil War. In this study of religion and politics, Lincoln deserves 
special note. One of the few presidents who never belonged to a church 
for any length of time, Lincoln often quoted Scripture and often mentioned 
God, Both sides before and during the Civil War used religion to justify 
their cause, but Lincoln’s religious justifications were tempered by
Mhis own undogmatic, unsectarian, and compassionate religious sensib.il- 
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ity.” Conservative protestants,, horrified by the Morman movement, 
put pressure on Lincoln, to act, especially because of the Mormans-1 
pecular notions about marriage. Lincoln, needing all the support he 
could get, compromised on the issue, Lincoln explained why he compromised
when he told Brigham Young1s emissary a story about life on the Illinois
prairie:
"Occasionally we would come to a log which had fallen down.
It was too hard to split, too wet to burn, and too heavy to 
move, so we ploughed around it. That’s what I intend to do
with the Mormans. You go back and tell Brigham Young that
if he will let me alone, I will let him alone.!'l'tJ
Lincoln was trying to steer the .same course of religious rationalism 
and worship~and~let-worship thought that marked the men of the Convention.
Lincoln died before the Civil War’s wounds healed and the super-heated 
evangelists drew Strength from post-war tensions. The Conservative.
Sect was not in a conciliatory mood and evangelical protestants "helped 
charge the conspiracy theories and bigotries, all of which shaped the
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monistic impulse in America for the next three-quarters of a century."
The Civil War invigorated American industry, and this "brought with 
it what contemporaries thought of as an 1 immigrant invasion1, a massive 
forty-year migration of Europeans, chiefly peasants, whose religions,
traditions, languagess and sheer numbers made easy assimilation impos~
4 5 4 6
sible. Catholics and small numbers of Mormans in this "invasion”
created paranoia which led the "majority to contradict its own commit-
47
ment to religious freedom and due. process of law. ” The post-war 
period saw a strenghtening of public education, exacerbating the Conser­
vative Sect’s alienation. One modern £undamentalist writer was disturbed 
t ha t
..state' education spread independent thinking, which took 
the place of the omniscient church in community circles.
People became increasingly at home in _this world and chose 
to work out their own intellectual salvation. Youth learned 
to question everything, including the most sacred realities
of life.
Religion itself was changing too, and like most everything else, 
it had to meet one criterion: Does It Work? Henry Steele Commager
wrote of the nineteenth century man that "his religion, too, notwith­
standing in Calvi.nistic antecedents, was practical. He was religious.
rather than devout, and with him the terra ’pious* came to be one of
,49disparag;ement „ ”
Discussions of alienation, protest, and a yearning for the past, 
give important understanding of what the Conservative Sect was and why 
it existed. The hard question is how much political success did it 
have? The answer, as America moved into the twentieth century, was that 
it had success only when the issues it found important were also impor­
tant to people outside the sect, which was not very often: the Alien
and Sedition Acts, laws banning some Mo'rman practices, etc. On the 
far-reaching issues of forming a. constitution,•regulating immigration, 
teaching in the public, schools, the sect was on the losing end. A 
political philosopher would attribute the sect’s lack of success to its 
organic rearward thinking, while the rest of the country was looking
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forward. The political scientist might say the sect was solely a 
reactive organism that could not exist except in the presence of a 
proactive stimulus.
In any event, America was changing while the conservative sect: 
was trapped by stagnant f undamentalist thought * The Bible was its 
travel guide, but where did the Bible lead? Deciding what the Bible 
said and meant was a difficult task for the fundamentalists and this 
study shall now examine how this task was undertaken and its political
implie cl tions,
If the Bible was brief and pithy, dictated by a single' author, 
and if it was about a non—abstract subject3 it would be an easy task 
to be a fundamentalist. However, the Bible has many books (some books 
not accepted by all) transcribed by many authors, and it contains 
allegory, parable, and poetry. If one believes the Bible is the only 
important thing, one might .withdraw thoroughly from the. unregenerate 
world. In this instance, politics is affected by the loss of this group. 
On the other side of the coin the religious person might try to extend 
the goodness of the church to the land. In this instance., politics is 
affected by the addition of this group. What course for the Fundamen­
talist : save souls and ignore politics; save souls and hope that politics
will improve indirectly; or improve politics by direct church interven­
tion? The answers to these questions are complex and entangled with 
qualifications and variance on each issue. The devil, too, can quote 
Scripture: in a political forum, politicians are free to give their
actions, a scriptural facade and, hende, a certain dignity and syllogistic 
invulnerab 11 ity (,fI am right, you are wrong, so there is no debate,")
In some instances, religion and politics can be discrete, but men 
of religion, are free to enter politics, and politicians are free to
19
quote Scripture. There is a temptation on both sides to do so.
Lincoln's old antagonists evangelist Peter Cartwrights once joked at
an Illinois convention: "I have waged an incessant warfare against;
the world, the flesh, and the devil, and all other enemies of the
. 50
Demo era tic Par ty.*'
Warfare against the; world, the flesh, and the devil was a common
occurance before the Constitutional Convention. During the "Great
Awakening" (mid~1700s), fundamentalist agitation swept the nation. The
most notable preacher of -the period, Jonathon Edwards, had a favorite
topic, "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," with vivid imagery of
what damnation was like: "Man, in his natural state of sinfulness, was
hung like, a loathsome spider in God's fingers. Henry Steele. Commager
fourid this fundamentalist thinking still a powerful force in the
twentieth century s
"That a people so optimistic and self-confident should accept 
a theology which insisted on the depravity of man, that a 
people so distrustful of all authority should yield so readily 
to the authority of the Scripture is interpreted by men like 
themselves, that a people so inclined to independence should 
take their religious ideas at second hand, that people; so 
scientific minded should resolutely ignore the impact of 
science in the realm of religion-— all of this is difficult 
to explain, except on fundamentalist grounds.
The fundamentalists had no pope, no Martin Luther, no John Wesley, 
no Joseph Smith, to show them the way. As a theological and political 
force, the fundamentalists depended upon a rather anarchical system of 
local, autonomous; preachers.
Current fundamentalist writers trace modern fundamentalism to the 
Bible Conference Movement, which began in the late 1870s and lasted 
approximately until the 1920s; "The Bible Conference Movement represented
fifty years of conservatives’ efforts to maintain their Christian witness.
53
in a cultural situation slipping from their grasp." The 1895 Niagara
conference was the watershed, when the "five essential doctrines" of
fundamentalism were adopted: (1) The Virgin Birth of Jesus, (2) Christ’s
death on the cross as payment for man’s sins, (3) Christ’s bodily return
to earth to establish the earthly Kingdom of God, (4) The. absolute
54inerrancy of the Bible, (5) The physical resurrection of Christ. In
1909 the twelve-volume The Fund amenta1s : A Testimony to the Truth was
published and "the effect was to stir up a militant antagonism toward 
liberalism which would reach its height in the decade which followed 
the Fir st WorId War. ”
With fundamentalism's intellectual vitality restored, the Conserva­
tive Sect was revitalized, too. Fundamentalist writer Stewart G. Cole
summed up the purpose of the new spirit:
"Fundamentalism was the organized determination of conserva­
tive churchmen to continue the imperialistic culture of his- 
toric Protestantism within an Inhospitable civilation dominated 
by secular interests and a progressive Christian i d e a l i s m . "56
Far from requiring total sect withdrawal from society, the movement
required of its members a-‘.certain degree of participation— to change
society back to the way it was.. Stated another way, the fundamentalists
read their Bibles and decided to become active in politics» Yinger
would find this decision consonant with alienated group behavior as
"...it is sometimes assumed, perhaps too quickly, that 
estrangement from political structures, personnel, and 
policies...leads to apathy, political withdrawal, and a 
low level of political participation...Yet is is also 
observed that the politically estranged may be swept up 
in enthusiasm for a political movement: „ " 3 1
The fundamentalists had made their changes in theological doctrine,
codifying certain biblical positions, and renewing their political
activism. What did not change was the lack of hierarchical structure
and the reaction-based nature of their political protest.
While the fundamentalists were meeting, immigrants came in greater
numbers than ever before, causing increased concern for conservatives,J 
Fundamentalism began to draw its greatest numbers from poorly and un­
educated strata and began to play more on prot.est.ant fears of Catholics
3 9and Jews, forming alliances with the Ku Klux Klan, ' and the Populist
movement.
The Populists, who sprang up during the economic troubles of the
late 1800s, fueled 'their rhetoric with charges of conspiracies and
dreams of the past as they "...looked backward to the lost agrarian 
60Eden." The Populists shared many notions as well as people with, the
Conservative Sect, taking on characteristics of the Sect to attract
certain voters. The foremost leader of the Populists, William Jennings
Bryan, gave the party an "unprecedented evangelical character”, and
his running mate in 1896, Thomas E. Watson of Georgia, was a "virulent 
61
anti-Catholic. ” ~ Bryan ’'defected" to the. Democratic party (later
taking the Conservative Sect’s side in the infamous Scopes "Monkey
Trial"), and Watson took over. Watson often charged that Catholic
convents were the scene of infanticide and unusual sexual practices and
that the Knights of Columbus were arming themselves. He also charged
that Jews ruled America's economy and engaged in ritual murder of 
62
Chrxstians. After Watson took command of the party, it faded from 
the scene.
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CHAPTER III 
THE CONSERVATIVE SECT, 1900 to 1975
The immigrants kept coming. By 1907 virtually all came from
Southern and Eastern Europe and "were predominately Catholic or-'
Jewish"»  ^ The high-water mark was in the period between 1.900 and
2
1920, dropping dramatically after that! Lipset and Raab note that
American politics had always been affected by the fluidity of the
underlying social- structure and “various .formerly entrenched groups
have felt disinherited. These situations in America have been the
2
typical wellsprings of right-wing movements. The Conservative Sect
had been feeling “disinherited” for nearly .100 years because of the
immigrant Influx, but in the early 1900s the influx reached Its peak
and so too did the sect’s anti-immigrant rhetoric. At the turn of this
century, "old landmarks were, losing their familiar contours in fact;
in rhetoric, therefore, they had to be affirmed all the more strenuously*“
One of the new faces of the Conservative Sect, William A. “Billy" Sunday,
took note of the Russian Jews and Italian Catholics, and memorably
described the.ni as "garlic-smelling, bomb-throwing, unassimilated 
5
immigrants." The Conservative. Sect was not In favor oi: welcoming these 
immigrants and helping them assimilate because the sect was, after all,
a reactionary group and reactionary groups, as Yinger said, “seek to
.6
increase the sense of alienation of their members *“
The Conservative Sect’s tendency to paint the darkest possible
picture of social change led to its tendency to make wild statements and
25
26
charges. These tendencies became apparent, as American Christianity 
changed in the twentieth century with some denominations becoming more 
liberals some more conservative» and some remaining indecisive..'7 The 
national unity during WWI extended to most churches, but iru:erdenomina­
tional warfare broke out after the war: ’’Only barely did the enthusiasm
of 1919 drown out the rumbling of schism that mounted to open battle in
8the fundamentalist wars of 1922 to 1927." These wars widened the split 
between the fundamentalists of the Conservative Sect and the liberal, 
mainline4 and established churches. Besides striking out at the teaching 
of evolution in public schools, the Conservative Sect cut its anti­
communist teeth by attacking the liberalized thinking in most other
denominations. At first, the Presbyterian church was hardest hit by
9
the "liberals-must-be-cornmunists" attacks of the 1920s. By 1929, 
"ultrafundamentalists11 had established their own Presbyterian seminary, 
at Westminster. The star pupil at the new seminary was Carl Mclntire, 
and "he more than any other individual would establish the ideology, the 
tone, and the momentum of the far right. Mclntire *s hunt, for commu­
nists in churches extended to the McCarthy era when he helped congressional
.1 g
investigators "locate ’suspects' within the c l e r g y . M c l n t i r e  charged 
that the Revised Standard Version of the Bible "was the product of a
’Red’ plot and that the World Council of Churches was a front, for 'the 
1 2
conspiracy,1" Mclntire guided the early careers of Major Edgar C.
13
Bundy, Billy James Hargis, and .Dr. Frederick Schv/ars*
Other fundamentalists took up the cudgels in the 1920s to ban the
teaching of evolution in the schools and their foray into politics "led
to the drive for anti-evolution statutes in nearly all Southern states
14
and. secured them in five." John T„ Scopes, a teacher in Tennessee, 
was convicted of teaching evolution, but his trial -pitting the agnostic
Clarence Darrow against fundamentalist elder-statesman William Jennings 
Bryan— -attracted so much negative publicity to the fundamentalists that 
they eventually backed off. One of the best-known of these publicists,
H. L. Mencken, wrote ’’the Book of Revelation has all the authority in 
these theological uplands of military orders in time of war. The people 
turn to it for light upon all their problems, spiritual and secular.
The Ku Klux Klan, "another rural Protestant enthusiasm of the 
twenties”,'' thrived in the post-war era, gaining power enough to scare 
the Democtratic party into not condemning it by name at the 1924 Conven­
tion.^^ The Klan was a part of the
"i..resurgence of that nativist spirit which identified 
Americanism with Anglo-Saxon Protestantism and found 
Roman Catholics, Jews, and sundry aliens from...Europe 
to be a menace to that way of li|:g inaugurated by the 
founding fathers of the nation.
Catholicism as a political issue came into sharper focus in .1928 
when A1 Smith was chosen to lead the Democratic party. "The Catholic 
issue as a political question was inseparable from an American Protestan­
tism that...identified itself with the state as a sectarian possession. 
Smith was also a "wet" and a big-city Democrat from New York, totally 
an anathema to the Conservative Sect, Herbert Hoover "denounced the use 
of religious intolerance by his supporters”, but the forces of ’’bigotry,
particularly in the South, introduced the issue of religion in the 
20campaign.” The reaction against Smith by the Conservative Sect
heightened religious tensions rooted in the anti-Catholic campaigns of
the early 1800s and "the underground campaign impugned the Americanism
21
of Catholics and thus gave a blow to their assimilation. When John 
F. Kennedy ran thirty-two years later, the Conservative Sect had lost 
its anti-Catholic allies but remained firmly against: Catholics in high 
office. In 1960, Bob Jones, Carl Mclntire;, Harvey Springer, Norman
Vincent Peale, and other evangelicals would join in anti-Catholic propa-
22 2 3
ganda as did virtually all other major fundamentalist groups.”'
One trend becoming more established in the twentieth century was the
tendency for the Conservative Sect to find its greatest strength in the.
South and rural areas, where clergy "attempted to suppress liberal.
. 24
thinking and to stabilize traditional Christianity." John Shelton
Reed wrote that "probably the most striking feature of the religion of
the South is that the region is, and has been since antebellum times,
2 5
monolithically Protestant." De Vries found in 1974 that
"Southerners were more than three times as likely as nonsoutherners to
be Baptists, and nonsoutherners almost three times as likely to be
26
Catholics." The South was developing as the main battle ground for
civil rights, and the Conservative Sect, which organically attempted to
conserve its status, was prepared to react.
The Quondam Complex would operate powerfully in this fight, with
the Conservative Sect viewing the agitators for civil rights as emptiers
of the glass; contrariwise, preachers for civil rights would view the
glass as only lialf-full* The civil rights movement operated as a pure
opposite to the Quondam Complex; the civil rights movement: saw the past
as the Way things should not be. Andrew Young quoted a black preacher
who put this difference succinctly; "’we ain't what we oughta be; we
2 7
ain't what we’re gonna be; but thank God we ain’t what we was* ' "
Carl Mclntire defended the status quo racial relationship, saying in 
1945 that "Jesus Christ repudiated the popular doctrine that is .on the
27
lips of thousands of preachers today— the. universal Fatherhood of God," 
The biographers of Billy Graham explained that "evangelical Protestantism
in the 1940s and 50s was overwhelmingly white and conservative on the
29
question of race." " The Conservative Sect, outnumbered at the polls by
29
non-fundamentalists, looked longingly again to the good old days when 
there was, in their view, no racial tension as "the insecurities of that
tension would tend to foster social nostalgias for an older America that
10
had not been forced to confront a radically pluralistic world.
The fight over civil rights touched off controversy in many denomi­
nations over whether churches should become actively involved in politics
31
at all. The Reverend Carl F. H. Henry, who edited Christianity Today
and who was one of the major thinkers of the conservative theology
school, wrote in 1964 that no church should become directly involved on
either side "except perhaps in the most extreme emergencies" and should
never speak to government "as one corporate body speaking to another,
32
in political terms." American Jews, while philosophically and
33
financially supportive of civil rights, remained wary of religious 
involvement in politics, "finding their own freedom in the development
of wide separation between church and state and in the growth of
34
religious t o l e r a n c e . In the 1960s, Jews, Catholics, Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and agnostics, found a Supreme Court more willing to pry
religion away from state activities and many groups were active in 
35b r in g ing s uit s.
The Conservative Sect, appalled that Protestantism (so useful as
an anti-communist, anti-Catholic tool) was being used as a tool against
racial bigotry, found themselves in a contradiction:
"Fundamentalist opponents of the social gospel often 
complained about politicising religion, but they were 
deeply engaged, in the same process. They set flinty faces 
against ecuminism, liberal theology, liberal politics, 
socialism, foreign aid, the United Nations, and the civil 
rights movement. In the Protestant underworld, ultra 
r i g l.i t-w in g 1 e a d e r s politic a 11 y e x ploi t e d r e 1 i g i o u s 1 i t e r a lism 
and parochialism.
The Reverend Billy Graham, a comparative liberal in the Conservative Sect
30
because of his ecuministic bent and his moderate civil rights views,
found himself in a difficult position as the presidential court prophet.
His relationship with President Kennedy cost him some friends and his
relationship with President Johnson was strained because Graham's
37
"basic theological constituency favor Senator Goldwater." Graham5 s 
relationships with presidents from Eisenhower to Nixon was a mixed 
blessing on.both sides, partly becuase Graham became a target for black 
clergymen: "White House sermons by conservative preachers who have a
vested interest in affluence and who preach a. status quo gospel will not
38
suffice." Graham stopped going to the White House after he staked his
fundamentalist, pious reputation on Nixon5s moral character. Graham
,39
said, "I can testify that he is a man of high moral principles." and
40
that came back to haunt him.
For American blacks, religion played an important part in their 
political involvement because "the best known spokesmen for the Negro 
in this period— Martin Luther King, Jr., James Farmer, James Baldwin,
Malcolm X— were sons of clergymen; King and Malcolm X were themselves
. < l ® 41ministers.,f Looking just at the rhetorical styles of the preachers 
on both sides of the civil rights question, both sides were one in the 
same. Garl Mclntire, Bob Jones, and Martin Luther King, Jr., were all 
superb preachers, tending to take the Bible literally, emphasizing the 
inevitability of God's Judgment. However, Mclntire and Jones saw God's 
Judgment in favor of the way things used to be; King saw God's Judgment 
in favor of the way things should be. That King was more successful 
with his message led many in the Conservative Sect to assume that King 
was successful through subversive means, but the charges, that King was 
a tool of the Kremlin, attended communist schools (King got his 
Doctorate at Boston University), and so on, are too preposterous to be
31
detailed here. Nonetheless, accusations of subversion, conspiracies, 
etc., on the part of civil rights activists were not surprising mani­
festations of conservative sect protest.
The tendency of the Conservative Sect to beget mythical anti- 
American conspiracies and then attack them was an established tradition 
going back at least to Jedidiah Horse. The Sect's first alleged conspira­
tors were the non-protestant immigrants, and later the Sect would charge 
that most any group that took a differing view," say, the National Council 
of Churches, had to be conspiring against cultural protestantism.
Paranoia became a politically actionable force, reaching maturity in 
the 1950s. Conspiracy theories fit neatljr into the concept of the 
Quondam Comples: Conservative Sect members, looking for reasons why
they are alienated from society, assume that others must have conspired 
to get ahead. During the Cold War there were new opportunities for the 
sect to ferret out conspiracies.
There were no great numbers of immigrants to fear, but there was 
widespread fear of communism, and many fundamentalist preachers would 
pay particular attention to communism*s anti-religious aspects. The 
sect had been developing its anti-communist rhetoric since the end of 
the First World War, when Billy Sunday, W. B. Riley, George McCready
Price, and others discovered global conspiracies "made up of Kaiserism,
.. 42.
evolutionism, Bolshevism, high criticism, and liberal theology,”
That such conspiracies existed seems now beyond credulity, but Carl 
Mclntire dropped Kaiserism and evolutionism from the mix and re-identified
"Bolshevism" with liberal theology in the 1950s. Mclntire, who found
/}. ^
the Revised Standard Version "the work of Satan and his agents", helped
Senator McCarthy and the House UnAmerican Activities Committee located
"red" clergy. His attacks evoked a backlash from mainline churches
44
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46-and from such politicians as Eisenhower that left his organization
foundering. Nonetheless, the Conservative. Sect looked fondly on the
period which, according to Gushing Strout, experienced a "quasi-religious
revival. In political terms the. new cult of religion was conservative,
. 46
nationalistic, and self-congratulatory." Theology had become an
important ingredient in the general anti-communist feelings and the
American foreign policy of containment, and in this the Conservative
Sect found allies in its fight to suppress ''liberal." theology, However,
as so often happened to the Sect, it rhetorically over-stepped its
bounds and was discredited. The general theology "that communism was
,.47wicked, like the devil, relentless" had given the Conservative Sect an
opening that it exploited until it went too far.
Communists and black preachers were, not the sole objects of the
Conservative Sect's wrath. Education had long been a battlefield for
clergymen of all descriptions as well as purely secular groups» Should
school children be led in prayers in Che public schools? And if so,
which prayer, and under what circumstances? During the late 1950s and
the early 1960s, several court suits were wending their way through
state and federal courts.
In 1963, the. Supreme Court issued its most definitive ruling on
school prayer, ruling on one case from Pennsylvania and one case from
Maryland jointly. Justice Clark, delivering the majority opinion, noted
that religion was an important part of American life, but.
"...what our Constitution indispensably protects is the 
freedom of each of us, be he Jew of Agnostic, Christian 
or Atheist, Buddhist or Freethinker, to believe or dis­
believe , to worship or not to worship, to pray or keep 
silent, according to his conscience, uncoerced and unre­
strained by government”48
The decision did not ban prayer in schools, as a student could still
constitutionally bow his head and pray; the difference was the student
would have to do it without guidance from the school,. The firestorm of
protest continues to day as a primary contention of conservative sect 
4 9
protest. The battle between the sect and' those, who wanted to keep the
30schools secularly 'neutral was, and is, nothing new, ' and because of
this, the activities of the sect draw great interest from the National
51
Educational Association and other teacherf s groups.
What is instructive about the activities of the Conservative Sect 
and its many sub-sects in the twentieth century is that little had 
changed in either the thinking or the style of the Sect. It still 
be;lloved lIu; glass was hulf-empty; it was being emptied by outsiders or 
subversives, and America was moving dangerously away from the ideals 
and the practices of the mythical founding fathers— -whom they claimed 
as members of the sect. The people who made up the Conservative Sect 
continued to decry the disorder and doubt they observed, and they 
continued to feel alienated. They, likewise, would also find their 
greatest strength in the South.
The nature of their targets would not change, although the faces
and names would. The immigrants attacked by Jedidiah Morse, the Know- 
Nothings,. the Populists, and Billy Sunday, no longer came from foreign 
countries, but there was still great fear within thee sect about foreign 
threats. As the 1970s began, the Conservative Sect would launch 
political attacks on immigrants from within American society— women 
immigrating from the kitchen, blacks from second class status, and homo­
sexuals immigrating from their hiding places into the mainstream. The 
attacks on secular education would continue, as would the attacks on 
churches holding different views on what the Bible really said.
Ironically, though the sect would fear the powerful impact of tech-
nology-— broadcasting— to its benefit.
Most important, the Conservative Sect demonstrated it had limited 
ability to effect regressive political change, unless allies were found 
to fight specific "threats1* such as communism. The Conservative Sect 
remained only an element of American conservatism.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CONSERVATIVE SECT AND THE 1980 CAMPAIGNS
When the followers of the Wesley brothers came to America from 
England, large crowds and many converts were drawn to the enthusiastic 
message these 'Methodists brought. Eventually the ministry became highly 
trained and scholarly, stopped riding the circuit, and became part of 
the establishment. Then, as Lipset said, "sects arose to satisfy the 
need for religious enthusiasm*”'*' Preachers with style, a loud voice, 
and a simple message drew people into the tent but the question, in this 
political study, was whether the people in the tent could be moved, to 
take political action. Technology eventually carried the preacher1s 
voice around the world; theoretically, satellites made all the world the 
preacher1s tent, but could the people be persuaded? The Conservative 
Sect developed its share of “electronic evangelists" who could conceivabl 
reach everyone with a radio or television, and who would try to persuade 
people that America should follow the example of the mythical "founding 
fathers".
There were new faces in the sect. Among them were Jerry Fa1we11,
whose, ministry included a thriving Baptist Church in Lynchburg, Virginia,
Liberty Baptist College, and a political organization with the imposing
o
title of the "Moral Majority"*'; a group that called itself "Christian 
Voice", based in California, and creator of the controversial congression
"report card"; "Religious Roundtable", founded by television evangelist
3James Robison and former advertising executive Edward McAteer ; and. other
lesser known groups. "The movement draws it strategists from secular
conservative lobbies and from such single-interest forces as the right-
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to-life and stop-ERA movements." Two of the most visible of these
strategists were Paul M. Weyrich, from the "Committee for the Survival
of a Free Congress", and Howard Phillips, a former Nixon aide who started
the "Conservative Caucus” . It was Weyrich who said, "we are talking
■ ^about Christianizing America.
Jerry Falwell* s Thomas Road Baptist Church was completed in 1970
and remains his base of operations. It Is the home of his "Old Time
Gospel Hour" television, show, which is his main source of income. ^  His
statement of religious doctrine was fundamentalist, similar to the.
doctrine of the 1895 Niagara Conference.1 The political arm of his
ministry, Moral Majority, formed in June 1979 with a stated purpose to
"bring this country back to G o d A  Moral Majority brochure explained
what Falwell set out do do: "He has accepted the burden of awakening
this republic to her national sin, calling this nation to a real moral
q
referendum, and turning America around toward the path of morality. ‘
True to fundamentalist tradition, Falwell attacked the non-fund amen ta1i s U 
churches as the source of America*s alleged spiritual sickness, saying, 
"What's the real problem in America...it1s not the Republican party or
* 1 nthe Democratic party. I'm neither, I'm a Baptist. It's the churches.11 ' 
And Falwell brushed aside theological criticism (especially from the old 
fundamentalist whipping-boy, the National Council of Churches): "The
problem is that we don* t agree with those buzzards— and that we outnumber 
them. Whether Moral Majority or the buzzards were of greater number
was debatable to political scientists, but Falwell was adement. Moral 
Majority set out to create "a moral climate in which it is .easier for 
politicians to vote right than wrong„uX/- and attempted to convince large
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numbers of voters they were immoral and must repent. This was a difficult 
task, because it ran counter to another great American tradition, of 
"live-and-Xet~live9 warship~and~let~worship."13
Christian Voice gained considerable publicity by attempting to 
quantify morality, distributing a. "moral report card" on congressmen 
that purportedly measured morality as a function of votes on fifteen 
issues with, "significant moral implications." ^  Some of the issues were 
difficult to imagine as being "moral" issues, such as the. creation of a 
Department of Education ("Moral": Yes vote, "Immoral": No vote.) The
author of the ratings, Gary Jarmin, argued the Department was supported
by the National Education Association, "which espoused a radical, secular-
15humanist _ philosophy." ‘ ' Even congressmen with unimpeachable conservative 
credentials, such as Representative Robert K. Dornan and Senator Jesse 
Helms, protested the ratings system. Dornan protested because he thought 
it was moving toward "creeping anti-Semitism" , ^ 0 and Helms asked:
"Hubert Humphrey and X didn't agree ninety percent of the time— did that 
mean he was more immoral?"I? The ratings drew considerable protest from 
mainline theologians because, "the report cards have deeply disturbed 
some Christian politicians who themselves turned to Scripture for guidance 
in finding solutions to our country's problems, yet have come to more 
liberal conclusions,'11^  The ratings were high for some, of the congress­
men indicted for taking bribes and for Representative Robert Bauman, who 
pleaded guilty to a homosexual solicitation charge, and were low for
the House’s clergymen, like Baptist, minister William Gray and Father
. 1 9  Ro o e r t D r in an.
Labelling political groups not belonging to the Conservative Sect 
immoral or unGodly was nothing new, of course. The immigrants Billy 
Sunday described as "garlic-smelling bomb-throwers" were now fully assimi-
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lated -Americans. So, there were new groups to affix labels to, such as 
"liberals11 and "secular-humanists". Labelling was an important part of 
the Sect’s behavior. John W. Burton said that
.social myth and prejudice...help to explain observed 
differences in culture and traditions not otherwise under­
stood. They provide a framework into which unknowns can 
be fitted...Barbarians and infidels were those who had 
different values,, cultural habits, and religious b e l i e f s . " ^
Burton was speaking about international relationships, but his point is
well taken in context. The Conservative Sect saw its country under
attack by outsiders who, while they were citizens, were un.Americ.an because.
they did not fit into the Conservative Sect * s definition of what an
American was. In the sect’s formulation, an American was one who
suffered from the Quondam Complex, that is, one who felt the Godly
.foundation of America had been attacked.
It. would be a mistake to link the Conservative Sect with all modern 
politicians who described, themselves as "born again" or "evangelical*"
For example, -congressmen John B. Anderson and Mark 0. Hatfield, and 
President Jimmy Carter were self-described "born-again" Christians, but 
were not. members of the sect. In fact, these men. were targets of the 
sect-— particularly Carter. Falwell said Carter’s support of the Equal 
Rights Amendment and his reluctance to support an anti-abortion constitu­
tional amendment "is a deep disappointment to God-fearing, God-loving 
individuals* Carter and Anderson were the object of similar comments 
during the presidential campaign.^z- Hatfield had little but contempt 
for the Conservative Sect, saying, "the Gospel is not a code, a set of 
rules, but the incarnate of God in Christ. The Gospel is a person.
When you say ’these are the issues that the moral majority.„„T —  that to 
me is apostasy."*0  Hatfield, did not see himself as a part of any group 
that "wrap their Bibles in the American Flag, believe that conservative
politics is the necessary by-product of orthodox Christianity, who equate
r f) /
■patriotism with the belief in national self-righteousness*” A *
Also, it would be a mistake to lump together the. Conservative Sect 
with religious movements such as the "Jesus People” and some other
o t
charismatic groups,^ There are other television evangelists;, such as 
Ernest W. Angle.y and Oral Roberts^ and other movement leaders such as 
Sun Myung M o o n , 27 who,; in crude terms, axe politically agnostic.
A central theme of this study is that. the. Conservative Sect has 
always been a part of American politics, and, as it is driven by reaction 
to change, it will be a part o£ American politics as long as. society 
keeps changing. The Sect looked out the window in the late 1970s and 
saw social tides running against it; sex roles and sexuality norms 
were perverted; secular education marched to the beat of ’’humanists”; 
youth not reading the Bible; communism on the move abroad while ”liberals” 
preached understanding of communism instead of confrontation. The sect 
always used the past as its ideal and this ideal was God-given.• Falwell 
said ,
” ...the Puritans and Pilgrams left an evangelical imprint on 
the. hearts and minds of the early Americans so that when they 
wrote the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rightss the 
Constitution, and the various state charters and constitutions, 
you can find the philosophies of the Puritans and Pilgrams in 
line are in line of these very important documents, We are a 
na t i o n un de r Go d .?' 28
Falwell and other conservative protestants found themselves in the 
headlines during the campaigns of 1980, but the. roots of their style of 
behavior were, old and well established. Lipset found
. . . the crusade to keep .America Protestant by imposing ascetic 
norms on the total population...is actually as old as the United 
States itself. . .in almost every generation., fold American’ groups; 
which saw themselves as ’displaced*, have sought to reverse these 
processes through the activities or moralistic movements or 
political action groups. Conflict between the. advocates of 
ascetic and nativist doctrines, usually associated with, the
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Federalist-Whig-Republican party, and their more culturally
cosmopolitan, opponents in the non-Southern Democratic party, 
has characterized much of American history."29
Richard Hofstadter found a common style that characterized these groups,
and described it as paranoid:
"The clinical paranoid sees the hostile and conspiratorial 
world.„.directed specifically against him; whereas the 
spokesman of the paranoid style finds it directed against 
a. nation, a culture, a way of life whose fate does not affect 
him alone but millions of others. . -.His sense, that his political 
passions are unselfish and patriotic, in fact, goes far to 
intensify his feeling of righteousness and his moral indigna- 
ticm.*'30
Patriotism and righteousness were the common themes of the rhetoric of 
the Conservative Sect throughout its existence, and it put a special 
emphasis on its self-styled morality: "Preservatist or restorative
movements— that is, backlash movements— require an agressively moralistic 
stance and will find it somewhere."31 Consonant with its Quondam Complex, 
"people or groups who are objects rather than beneficiaries of change
'X 0
tend ot seek a general {fundamentalism1 * -of order *”
The use of moralism worked to the detriment of the Conservative
Sect first because there is not American Sanhedrin and, hence, no firm
set of moral rules, and second, the making of avuncular moral judgments
about one’s brother caused anger and resentment and led to conflict.
Burton wrote about this sort of conflict, saying
"...even now there has been discovered no clear demarcation 
between mores that are ethical, and those that are cultural, 
religious, legal, or merely a matter of etiquette. This 
failure to distinguish ethics from culturally based norma­
tive rules leads to the making of moral judgments by some 
sections of the community on the behaviors of others... Social 
tensions and conflicts must result."23
It is beyond the range of this study to say what is moral and what is
not, but what can be said is that moralism and politics are an explosive
mixture. The lure of political gain can tempt the moralists, and moralism
can create conflict in a political forum. Insofar as the Conservative 
Sect is concerned, nioralisxn is an important part of its appeal and this 
had political implications whether its moral appeal is sound or not..
Another central theme in this study is the Conservative Sect has 
always justified its political behavior by identifying with "founding 
fathers"; just as it sought fundarae.ntal.ism in its religion, it sought: 
fundamentalism in its politics. Pat Robertson, founder of the Christian 
Broadcasting Network, wrote (in a pamphlet distributed at a "Washington 
For Jesus" rally) in reference to the first English landing at Cape 
Henry, "on that day, a very brave people came ashore...and claimed this 
land for Jesus, It' is our intention to reclaim it for Jesus in our 
generation. According to Roberson, "government was to be the servant: 
of God’s p e o p l e . "35 Falweli’s Moral Majority was based on the same 
premise, that "America, which began on such great: promise, [was] founded 
upon the principles of the Bible* “" Again, the policy of the Conserva­
tive Sect (Falwell and Robertson might be. considered sub-sects unto 
themselves) was not to create something new but to recreate nostalgic: 
protestantism. There were many villains to blame for •'Americaf s supposed 
turn away from its "great promise*” and these villains were generally 
"liberals" or, in other words, anyone who did. not agree that America 
was founded for Jesus or upon biblical principles.
As Hofstadter noted above, spokesmen of 5;the paranoid style saw 
their nation under attack. James Robison, of the Religious 'Roundtable,, 
said, "we are either going to have a Hitler-style takeover, a dictator­
ship, Soviet communist domination or we're going to get right with God 
in this country."3 ^ The executive director of Christian Voice, Richard 
T. Zone4 bald, "evangelicals are waking up to the fact that we’re losing 
our country."38 Paul Weyrich said that: "Middle Americans did not begin
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to wake up in large numbers until this past year...The impression given 
in our. mass media is that homosexuality, communal marriages, abortion, 
and women in the. military combat are perfectly normal and even desire- 
able. "39 Not just the Conservative Sect was under attack, the nation 
was under attack; "If we look at the sin of sodomy and the destruction 
of the city of Sodom, we’re at the brink of destruction. Homo­
sexuals were favorite "invaders” in the sect’s literature. Bob Jones,,
Sr., said that because of homosexual activities in San Francisco, "I 
wouldn’t want to live in that town; one day it’s going to fall into the 
sea--— God warned then with Mt. Saint Helens (the volcano that erupted in 
Washington State , )!Vdl
There were other "invaders" from within, particularly "liberal" 
judges (who legalized abortion, women1s rights, took prayer out of the 
schools, etc.), the schools (which taught "humanism"), the media, and 
"liberal" politicians, and mainline churches received special scorn. 
Robertson said, "the courts, in league with the leftist-oriented American 
Civil Liberties Union, a handful of athiests, Unitarians, and liberal 
Protestant and Jewish groups, have successfully 'deChristianized' our
j ^ ry
public life." As for secular public schools and colleges, the President
of Liberty Baptist College, A. Pierre Guillermin* said they were
"controlled by a rationalistic approach which had no '".standards of right
and wrong Most members of the Conservative Sect had given up trying
to prove there were conspiracies underfoot and yet: according to the chief
spokesman for Moral Majority,
"...for the past forty years, there has been a similar ’mindset' 
of people involved in government and the media: these people
believe that you can throw money at problems, they go to the :1
same kinds of schools, read the same: kinds of books, they 
share a. similar world view.
A recurrent theme in conservative sect literature was the need for
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correction of the "moral drift" of America could not be entrusted to 
"liberal" politicians and theologians, but was the responsibility df 
"Bible believers«... [who ] have sat out the political process," ^  Christian 
Voice co-founder Robert Grant was empirically correct in that "if 
Christians united, we can do> anything. We can pass any law or amendment 
If all Christians, from Methodists to Catholics to Baptists, worked 
together on the same legislation, their numbers would make them politi­
cally invincible. Who 'would lead this crusade? A Moral Majority pamphlet: 
trumpeted its founder, Jerry Falwell, under the headline "A Hew Kind of 
Leadership:...recognizing the impending cirsis, one man— -a man of proven
f. *“/
leadership and true vision— has stepped forward,,”' Nevertheless, one 
wondered whether the Conservative Sect itself, let alone all the other 
demoninations and sects:in America, would recognize Fa1we11 as the leader, 
or any other person for that matter. There had never been a viable 
religion-based party in America, hence, the Conservative Sect * s age- 
old problem reappeared: it was politically stunted for it had no
mechanisms to make its disparate sub-sects work in concert, no selection 
of leaders, no codification of doctrine. It could ■■'.not act, only react.
The issues agitated by the Conservative Sect during the 1980 
campaigns were primarily issues that were reheated and somewhat redefined 
from the past: sex and sexuality issues, such as abortion, homosexuality,
women's roles, etc.5 foreign threats, and the concurrent need for military 
superiority; institutional support for religion, such as prayer in the 
schools and the teaching of evolution.^ Billy G r a h a m , C a r l  Mclntire 
and his followers like Billy James H a r g i s , h a d  focused on the same
11.1 ings thirty yea.rs before.
These issues demonstrated the Conservative Sect* s organic preoccupa­
tion with the mythical past, when only monogamous couples had sex, when
America was afraid of no foreign foe, when prayer was a morning ritual
in public schools. Falwell nostagically recalled
"...when I was growing up...the family was clearly a 
husband-wife relationship...A homosexual in my child­
hood was looked on as a moral perversion...Here In 
America, our moral values are changing. And now, when 
someone takes a moral, -stand.. .he is locked upon as- a 
bigot „ "51
Being a sect, which meant separation from society, the Conservative Sect 
found itself in a. familiar dilemma: how could it stay separate and
still get involved in politics? The Sect solved this dilemma by pro­
claiming its devotion to non-partisanship and then got involved in 
partisan po1itics anyway.
The partisanship of the sect was exemplified in one issue of the 
Moral Majority Report which had this headline: "Garter Camp Takes Aim
at 1 Electronic Evangelistsrn, and in another headline which said, nGay 
Leaders Visit White House: Aide Maddox More Comfortable with Homosexuals
than Fundamentalists That issue had many -.articles about homosexuality
(eight of seventeen articles dealt with it) and the articles advanced 
the notion that homosexuality was on the increase and Democrats were
c q
politically linked to homosexual groups. Falwell told his "Old Time 
Gospel Hour" audience "we* re not involving ourselves in partisan politics,," 
but his aide Robert Billings (who served on the Reagan campaign and 
administration staffs) said, "the truth is, where the rubber hits the 
road, Moral Majority is pro-Reagan, ex-officio.nJJ It was difficult to 
directly link the Conservative Sect with political conservatives in 
general, given the confusion over the popular use of the term "conserva­
tive,""^ but it was accurate to say, reviewing the literature of the 
sect,- it was still closely aligned with the "Federalist-Whig-Republican" 
party. The sect was ecstatic over the results of the 1980 elections 
Jatmin, of Christian Voice, wrote that "it points to the beginning of a
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new era” ; Falwell. wrote "we were surprised to win such an overwhelming 
victory in almost every s t a t e * ”  ^ 8  Weyrich said, "the sleeping giant of 
America’s TMoral Majority’ has awakened at last."59
One last note on the issues of the Conservative Sect concerns the 
impressionistic observation of the writer that the sect seems to be 
preoccupied with sex as a national issue, Anti-tr.aditional-Thasculine 
figures, such as homosexuals and feminists, were the objects of a great 
bulk of the sect's literature. There, was much about "begating" in the 
Bible, and many stories about male-female relationships, and perhaps 
this is the source of the Sect’s preoccupation. What would seem a. more 
likely explanation, however, was that sexual issues attracted media 
attention and their visibility attracted the sect because of its hyper­
sensitivity to change. Another explanation'might be that homosexuals 
had a limited ability to fight back in political forums and were a 
handy target. Psychological research would be the best way to discover 
why the sect used sex. as an issue, but it was important in a political 
study to note, what issues the. sect planned to prosecute in political 
forums, and sex was certainly one. of them. As a political strategy, 
the use of sex as an issue would help an hamper the sect’s political 
strength. It would help because most other traditional politicians were 
concerned with the mundane issues like taxes, and the sect had sex as 
an issue to itself. It would hurt because sex is a narrow platform to 
build a national base, and many prefer not to talk about the subject; 
in open forums. Rhetorically, sex was an attention-getter, good for 
drawing headlines. Christian Voice, for example, got its start in
California as a political action group that campaigned for a. state
60referendum to ban homosexual teachers from schools. ' Falweli, at his
many "I I Love America" rallies, was eminently quotable for such lines as
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f'i 1*'God made Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve, and pornography was "on 
main street... dumped like a cesspool into our living rooms through TV,” ^  
Many of the sermons of Falwell, Robison, et al, contained a passage 
that began with "when I was growing up,..*" and then much was made of 
the changes they perceived in America regarding sex and the relative 
roles of men and. women. Assuming they were correct, and assuming further 
something should be done politically to change things back to the way 
they supposedly were, what sort of action would one take? Popular 
support for a tax rollback is politically actionable; taxes can be rolled 
back. However, how can one legislate a. rollback in sexual practices and 
sex roles? If abortion was made unconstitutional, would that stop 
abortion? Could one liquidate pornography? These are questions whose 
answers would have to take into account the ability of politicians to 
control social change. The irony for the Conservative Sect was that 
on one. hand the sect demanded that government get out of private lives, 
but on the other hand, it demanded that government get involved in the 
most private aspects of people* s lives.
Political Reaction to the Conservative Sect
The names and faces had changed through the years, but a central 
concept— the Quondam Complex— proved a remarkably stable and constant 
method of identifying and understanding the Conservative Sect. Just as 
followers were attracted to the sect’s emphasis on the conservation of 
mythical fundamental political, and religious ideals, there was a consider­
able number of people who opposed the sect. Significant: responses came 
from theologians and political figures.
The theological responses were politically important because they 
served to erode the public* s perception of the Sect. The response of
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theologians who were not conservative was uniformly negative and was 
based on two points: the Conservative Sect was too judgmatic and the
sect had peculiar, if not dangerous and inaccurate ideas about what the 
Bible taught. Christian Century editorialized that ’’the demand for 
purity on single issues, or -more precisely, clusters of;\ernotion-laden 
issues, is a dangerous trend”, because ’’Christian faith should not be 
used by either the left or the right to demand purity in situations 
where purity is an i m p o s s i b i l i t y . " ^  Other writers were concerned 
about, the issue of "purity” and how the Sect had baptised its view
£ t
as "pure.” ”14 Senator Hatfield said, "what I react against is the equating 
of a political issue with one3 s morality or one’ s relationship with Godw”D-> 
The President of the National Council of Churches, William Howard, 
argued "we can’t use polarization as a .tactic for raising funds to 
combat people taking positions different front us. It would lead to 
an ugly religious war
Other theologians were concerned about the sect’s biblical inter­
pretations. Martin Marty read Matthew 25 and argued 'that on Judgment 
Day, Christ will ask whether one fed the hungry, clothed the naked, 
etc., and not about one’s stand on the Equal' Rights Amendment or prayer 
in schools. Another wrote "we need to maintain a. spirit of humility.
We must admit that we do not always clearly fathom the complexitites of 
these policy issues."68 The President of the Union Theological Seminary, 
Donald Sh'river, was worried that the Conservative Sect would drive 
people away from religion:- "Evangelicals will subject the gospel of
Jesus to unnecessary rejection by others if they identify it with any
■ f" Qpolitical program.”
The arguments of the more "liberal" theologians had a large poten­
tial political impact. First, the outnumbered fundamentalist churches
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substantially in m e m b e r s h i p , and second, denominations such as' the
Methodists and the Roman Catholics have large, well-established lobbying
organizations in W a s h i n g t o n . T h e  opposition of these churches helped
(and will help) reinforce separatist beliefs within theoConservative
Sect and gave the sect another opponent to attack but also limited the
sect5 s ability to attract, members and form coalitions with mainline
churches. Whether the fundamentalist foundation of the Sect will ever
be subjected to theological criticism is unlikely, becuase as sociologist
John Scanzoni put it,
"genuine dialogue, leaving open the possibility of mutual
change, is by definition unknown to the fundamentalists.
It is that incipient sect mentality that has tended to
plague evangelicalism, and which has often kept it from 
building bridges with mainstream Christianity.11 ^2
The response of the conservative Churches had its negative aspects, 
too.. First there was the nagging problem of sectarian behavior; if one
is a separatist, how can one get involved with other churches to fight
political wars? Bob Jones, Sr., in an interview with the writer, said 
he commended Moral Majority and other sub-sects for their morality and 
patriotism, but he could not joint them "because thatVs ecumenism, and 
thatf s forbidden in the. Scripture." According to Jones, God is not 
"glorified" when you building the ecumenical movement, "which is the
"7 O
Antichrist*"f ~ Jones' reluctance to join with other churches stemmed 
from an old controversy involving the ecumenical "Christian. Unity"' move­
ment among Protestants that began in earnest at the turn of this century. 
The anti-ecumenists thus served to reinforce the Conservative Sect's 
split into many sub-sects which may hold similar views but which cannot 
work, together.
Other conservative church responses involved the contention that 
preachers should be engaged in preaching, not politicking. Bailey Smith,
President of the Southern Baptist Convention, said, "we have to be care­
ful, in identifying all conservative political views as synonymous with 
Christianity. . .The way some of these men talk, I think they'* re more, 
excited about missiles than, about the Messiah.’1^  Television evangelists 
Pat Robertson and Jim Bakker both delved into conservative political 
topics on their television shows, but both put distance between them­
selves and other members of the Conservative Sect on the issue of 'politi­
cizing religion. Robertson, in his letter of resignation from, the 
Religious Roundtable, wrote he would "avoid anything which would cause 
confusion in accomplishment of [our mission &£ reaching people for the 
Lord Jesus Christ. ]" f 0 Robertson wrote that. Christians have a constitu­
tional right to political activism, but "we must constantly guard our­
selves, lest we lose our role as arbiters of eternal truths and take in 
exahcnge the role of political advocates.u^  Bakker scorned the sect's 
advocacy of conservative politicians” "I don’t think God is a .Republican
. . 7 Q
or a Democrat who is pretty clearly active for one candidate." ^ Bakker's
position was that religion organizations should give political counsel
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when asked and should pray for elected leaders. The Executive Director 
of the National Religious Broadcasters, Ben Armstrong, said NEB guide­
lines prohibited involvement in politics; "A few broadcasters who claim
to be the heads of churches but devote their air time to political comraen-
.,80tary...are not and cannot be affiliated with NRB."' Armstrong said,
"there was only one cause, to champion and that was to bring people into 
a closer relationship with Goal The impact of conservative church, 
criticism was difficult to assess in hard political terms, but this 
criticism did indicate conservative churches were not a monolithic unit 
ready to do political battle.
When the polls closed it was plain the condidates supported by the
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Conservative Sect had won, or, more accurately, the candidates attacked 
by the sect had lost. How big a role did the sect play? Poll data, 
discussed in the next chapter, indicated the election would have probably 
turned out the same without the sect's involvement; indeed, the data 
indicated the possibility that many of the sect * s favorites would have 
won larger victories if they were not involved with the sect. The reaction 
of President-Elect Reagan, when asked about how much he would listen to 
Moral Majority and similar groups that supported his candidacy, was 
definitively lukewarm: "I am going to seek advice where I think I can
get advise on a particular problem, ask their help, and, uh, I don’t 
any other way to say it, uh, than that d 1^  A month before the election, 
Reagan had gone to Falwell*s church in Lynchburg and avoided religion 
and morality while making his standard attacks on’ Carter, saying things 
like, ' government can aid family, life by reducing unemployment. . ."
Reagan’s limp embrace of the Conservative Sect was understandable in 
light of a poll taken by Republicans in Virginia, in which very few 
voters said they would vote for ’’evangelical candidates**" and almost
one-third of those polled responded unfavorably to Jerry Falwell the
highest of any public figure mentioned.
The limitations facing the Conservative Sect’s quest for political 
power were built into its Quondam Complex: operating on a narrow base
of issues that were biblically related or related to the sect’s perception 
of the faith of the "founding father", the sect had a difficult time 
becoming involved in tradition political arguments that swung large 
numbers of voters— such as economic growth, taxes, city services, etc.
Moral Majority’s Director of State Organizing, Charles Cade, said that the 
organization’s own polls indicated this problem;
"Abortion, pornography, those, are hard for average Christians
to relate to. They don’t read Playboy, their daughters aren’t
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pregnant, they don* t know any queers. But when people." s 
life savings are deteriorating at fifteen to twenty 
percent a year, tha,t5 s evl 1 . ”^5
Whether the various sub-sects such as Moral Majority, Religious Round­
table, Christian Voice, and so on, could broaden their issues-base remained 
to be seen* Cal Thomas, of Moral Majority, implied in a post-election 
commentary that Moral Majority was merely one voice in the. political 
wilderness: "I believe God has chosen certain persons to speak, out on
nuclear power and racism while He. has .called others to speak out about
q fc
abortion and pornography. Whether Moral Majority, for one, would
seek to broaden its base remained in doubt. In December 1980, Falwell 
sent a. letter to Moral Majority members seeking "the largest sacrificial 
gift" because
"...for the last several months the press reported the state­
ments and activities of many who are doing everything in their 
power to chop down the Moral Majority and discredit me. These 
persons have been vicious and calculating in their orchestrated 
attacks. . .but we"ve stood our ground and -.continued to fight 
'.relentlessly for the moral principles you and 1 want restored 
to our great nation,
If this letter was any indication, Moral Majority changed little as a
result of its experience. The elemental Issues, present the Conservative
Sect1s rhetoric throughout history— paranoia, righteousness, the need to
* * r e store’1 --remained.
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CHAPTER V
A CASE STUDY OF A NORFOLK STATE SENATE ELECTION
Thus far in this study there was little empirical data on the 
political capabilities of the Conservative. Sect. In this chapter 
survey data will be exmained as part of a case study of the 1979 State. 
Senate races in Norfolk, Virginia. The data generally supported this 
utmly*u thesin that the Conservative Sect has only limited political
impact and tends to attract opponents as easily as adherents. This case, 
study was only one examination of one race in one city and as such it 
would be difficult to make generalizations about American politics as 
a whole. Where available, national polling data will be used to facilitate 
generalizations on specific issues; otherwise, the case study stands, by 
itself.
The Norfolk State Senate race was a good test of the Conservative 
Sect* s political, abilities-— at least on a local level-— for three reasons:-
First, Norfolk state senate races were historically conducted in 
stable, nonvolatile circumstances, generally unaffected by national issues. 
Democrats almost invariably were elected regardless of which party 
controlled Congress or the Presidency, The circumstances were thus 
controlled and rather constant, untainted by outside political influence.
Second, this race offered a contest: Involving a. conservative Republican 
challenger who espoused conservative religious views and another Republican 
challenger who was a conservative Baptist minister, both of whom contended 
the incumbents were too "liberal” and supported "immoral" legislation,
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such as the Equal Rights Amendment, Medicaid-paid''.abortions, etc.^ A 
third Republican challenger was a non-Chris tian who challenged the incum­
bents on more traditional ’political grounds. The former two challengers 
were thus good standard-bearers for the Conservative Sect’s political 
viewpoint and the latter challenger acted as a rough control in the 
polling data analyses.
Third, this race was in the "Bible Belt" of American society,^ arid 
one would expect that if the sect's politics was to succeed, it would 
succeed in Virginia, the home base of Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson.
The conservative religious candidates did very poorly, finishing fifth 
and sixth in a six-way race, and the opportunity was presented to examine 
some reasons why they failed, In this case study, some of the reasons 
why struck deep into the viability of conservative religious involvement 
in politics, foremost among them, voters reacted unfavorably to any 
political involvement at all by religious organizations. Further, the 
two conservative religious challengers spent considerable time campaigning 
in churches and because they did this and lost, the idea that churches 
were efficient vehicles of political persuasion was discredited.
Republicans made impressive gains in Virginia following the breakup 
of the Byrd Machine in the late 196Os-early 1970s, and the GOP dominated 
statewide contests and congressional races by the mid-19 70s.“ However, 
in 1979, the State Senate and the House of Delegates were still Democratic 
strongholds. In Norfolk, three Democratic incumbents— Stanley C, Walker, 
Joseph T. Fitzpatrick, and Peter K. Babalas— ran against a full slate of 
Republican challengers— Meyera E. Oberndorf, R. Wayne Nunnally, and G. 
William Ralph— and the top three vote-getters would be elected to the 
Senate from Norfolk, "It’s a milestone for the Republican party," said 
Norfolk GOP Chairman Albert Teich, "possibly the first time since Recon-
struction the Republicans have contested every Senate seat. Behind 
Teich* s optimism, however, there was the primary problem of running 
against three entrenched incumbents.
Two of the challengers', Nunnally and Ralph, attempted to use their 
conservative religious beliefs as political issues. Both were self- 
described "born again" Christians, and both attempted to bring to light 
issues of "morality" in the campaign.^  Curiously, their fellow Republican 
challenger * Oberndorf, was- a Jew, and she came closest to unseating an 
incumbent while running her campaign independently of Nunnally and Ralph.
Oberndorf1s refusal to run with her fellow Republicans was under­
standable in. light of a few incidents that marred the campaign. Nunnally 
was accused of anti-Semitism after he poked fun at Jewish traditions and 
h.e made regrettable comments about Fitzpatrick (calling him a "prostitute") 
a 11 d B ah a. 1 as (cru e 11 y j cst in g ab o ut B ab a 1 a s* bon e d i s e a s e») ^  Ra 1 p h 
campaigned solely on what he called "moral" issues such as abortion. A 
Baptist minister, he ran his campaign with the help of some area churches, 
and even had Jerry Falwell come to Norfolk to help raise money.' Ralph's 
rhetoric indicated he saw his country under attack and he said it was 
time to turn society around, to restore it to the way it was:
"I am concerned about family things...There is a moral 
majority in this country and we want to bring -morality 
back to Richmond. 1 don’t really have time to talk about
my [electric] bill when they are killing a -million babies 
a year. Our Democratic opponents say what we are talking 
about is garbage-— and they support abortion and the Equal 
Rights Amendment.
That Oberndorf had decided to go it alone was driven home by an
advertised endorsement from Norfolk’s popular Republican congressman,
G. William Whitehurst, which praised Oberndorf * s stand on taxes, etc.,
q
and totally ignored Nunnally and Ralph, and any "moral" issue." Oberndorf 
notably stopped any association with her "running-mates" after a stormy
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meeting with a Jewish women* s organization* at which she faced lacerating 
questions about her "runni/a g~mates" conservative religious views. She
1 fVleft the meeting in tears, J-u The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, in its Sunday 
editions before the election, noted "Mrs. Oberndorf * s attempt to crack 
the Democratic. * team* has centered primarily on Bab alas, while. Nunnally 
and the third Republican challenger, the Rev. G. William Ralph, have 
b an dec! together.!t ^ ^
With the Republicans in near-fratrieide, the Democrats concentrated 
on the tedious, little-noticed things that win local elections, such as 
putting together precinct task forces to knock doors, man telephone hanks, 
and hand out literature,, Most of the public attacks were aimed at 
Oberndorf and usually dealt with charges that she was an opportunist., 
a turncoat Democrat, and-— being a Virginia Beach Gouncilwoman— had the
“I <r\
interests of Virginia Beach, not Norfolk, at heart.x (The senate 
districts in question comprised all of Norfolk and a very small slice of 
the City of Virginia Beach, where Oberndorf resided.) When asked 
specifically about their religious beliefs, each of the Democratic 
incumbents told the writer they were deeply religious, were involved in 
church affairs and believed in God, but religion had not place in politics 
or government.
By no stretch of the imagination was religion a hotly debated issue 
in the election, and the most popular religious question that did surface 
concerned Oberndorf* s uneasy relationship with her "born again** fellow 
Republicans. Ken Geroe, chief strategist for the Democratic campaign, 
said Ralph * s manager called on the eve of the election and boasted that
church buses would bring thousands of Ralph and Nunnally voters to the
7 ^polls, swamping the Democrats.— ' Few, if any, of those buses made it, 
or if they did the parishioners left the buses and voted for someone
other than Nunnally or Ralph,. The1. Democrats ran as a team, stressed 
their time-honored political virtues like, experience and service,, and 
left the Republicans to their own self-destructive devices. Nunnally 
and Ralph did receive the endorsement of Norfolk City Councilman Ch 
Conoly P h i l l i p s a n d  this deserves note. Phillips was a self-described 
"born again" Christian candidate when he ran for the Democratic nomina­
tion for United States Senate in 1978. Phillips created a stir by his 
politically unorthodox campaign, and he was particularly vague about 
issues such as taxation and foreign affairs, saying, "God has not 
revealed to me all He would want me to do." Phillips ran because he 
"was called upon to represent Jesus Christ in the United States Senate."'" 
Phillips enlivened the primary and attracted attention by holding 
"prayer-group caucuses" but he did poorly.^
This study has focused on the Conservative Sect’s organic limitation 
to specific "moral" issues and the resultant limited political impact 
of the Sect. This hypothesis was put to a test in the following examina­
tion of poll data from the week following the November 6th 1979 Norfolk 
State Senate elections. In general terns, the data showed Norfolk voters 
knew little about the conservative religious beliefs of Nunnally and 
Ralph. In any event, there were indications the Norfolk voters would 
not have responded positively to conservative religious issues!
A telephone survey was conducted among registered voters who said 
they voted in the Senate election. No respondents who said they did not 
vote in the election were included. The survey was conducted the week 
following the election, with thirty-three questions asked about whom.e 
the respondents voted for, sources of information about the candidates, 
and the respondents1 political and religious v i e w s . T h e  names of
6 A
potential respondents were drawn from a complete list of registered
1 H
voters broken down by precinct. Approximately 500 potential respondents 
were contacted and from this group, 277 agreed to answer the complete 
survey. Table One shows how the actual vote compared with the votes 
respondents said they cast.
As one can sees the survey vote results were similar :to the actual
vote, though a bit more Democratic; this may be due to sampling error
or due to the respondents1 reluctance to identify with the losers, and
certainly some voters forgot whom they voted for. In any case, it was
clear the Democratic Team won the 'day (Democrats also swept the House
of Delegates races)„ with Oberndorf providing a good scare. The "born
again. Christian" candidates finished, to put it in the words of Demo-
1 Qcratic strategist Geroe, "in the nickel seats," " In the actual vote, 
Oberndorf did well in the nine Virginia Beach precincts but was soundly 
beaten in the ten. "black precincts" in Norfolk. Nunnally and .Ralph ran 
fifth and sixth, respectively, in all precincts and, notably, Ralph ran 
sixth in the Ingleside precinct,, the home of his Baptist church.
In the survey, thirteen percent of the respondents said they con-* 
sidered themselves to be Republicans, and it would seem Nunnally and 
Ralph received essentially the vote of Republican identifiers. At the 
outset, it would be tempting to say Nunnally and Ralph got only the votes 
of Republicans and explain the election5' s outcome on the basis of partisan­
ship among voters; Norfolk was a Democratic stronghold, and therefore 
Republican, candidates could expect to lose, Oberndorf received about 
one-half of her votes in the survey from, respondents wTho said they 
considered themselves Independents while Nunnally and Ralph received 
almost none from Independents and this could explain why she came much 
close to beating an incumbent.
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Table One. Actual Vote and Su:rvey Vot:e.
CANDIDATE
Actual3,
Vote %b %c
Survey
Vote.
(N=277)
fA
/p
Walker 23,821 21 30 199 72
Fitzpatrick 21,153 19 99 15.5 60
Sab ala s 20,896 19 22 153 60
Oberndorf. 20,023 18 17 122 44
Nunnally 13,614 12 7 46 17
Ralph 12., / 3 8 .11 c: o *7.J / 13
TOTALS 112,245 100 100 7.12
a. Actual vote .from Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, 7 November 1979, Dl-2.
b. Percentage of total votes cast by all voters.
c. Percentage of total votes respondents said they cast.
d . Percentage of survey respondents (N=277).
e. Total votes case by all respondents; each respondent could vote for
three candidates or fewer of the six candidates on the ballot.
Party identification is generally an important: factor to be ■ * 
considered in almost any election at any level and Table Two shows how 
the candidates fared on a partisan basis. While all the candidates 
other than Nunnally and Ralph received an even distribution of Independen 
and Democratic votes— even,packing up a number of Republican votes—  
Nunnally and Ralph received about nine out of ten of their votes from 
Republicans. Again,, in Norfolk1 s state house elections. Republicans do 
not win because there too few Republicans. Perhaps Nunnally and Ralph 
receive only the vote of partisan Republicans because very few voters 
knew anything about them. Respondents were asked, ’'what have .you -heard 
about Nunnally or Ralph*H and if they had no answer, they were probed 
with follow-up questions such as, "have you heard anything about his 
party, or what he stands for?” The result was that seventy-two percent 
could identify neither the party nor the issues relating to Nunnally 
and eighty-three percent had similar'blank responses to Ralph.
Table Three shows the distribution of Nunnally and Ralph votes by the 
respondents’ religious identification and, again, there was a demonstra­
tion of the apparent narrow appeal of the pair. The other candidates 
virtually swept non-Protestant voters while Nunnally and Ralph depended 
heavily on Protestants. This may have been related to the strong corre­
lation of the respondents' religious identification with a party identi­
fication, i.e., about ninety percent of those who said they were Catholic 
or Jews also said they were Democrats. Further, Nunnally’s and Ralph's 
total vote from Protestants was less than the Protestant vote for each of 
the incumbents: forty-one respondents who said they were Protestant vote
for Nunnally or Ralph while over eighty respondents who said they were 
Protestant voted for one of the incumbents. The incumbents’ strong 
showing among Protestants may have been partly due to the. inaumbents’ 
near sweep of black respondents: forty-six of the forty-seven black
Table Two. Respondents¥ Party Identification by Vote,
651
Party Identificatiorii
Democrat 
Republican 
Indenendent
Nun/Ral 
(N=48)
86
10
All Others^ 
(N=321)
40
20
40
a, Frofa the question, ”1 politics, do you generally consider -yourself
to be a Democrat, a Republican, or an Independent?"
b . Total of all votes cast for candidates other than Nunnally or Ralph,
Total is more than number of respondents (277) because each respon­
dent could cast more than one vote.
respondents said they voted for one of the incumbents and ninety-two 
percent of the black respondents said they were Protestant.
As discussed before in this study, some blacks may be. conservative 
theologically but that does not mean they are necessarily political 
conservatives; William Ralph and Martin Luther King, Jr., were both 
Southern Baptist preachers but were polar opposites politically. Ralph 
explained to the writer before the. election why he had not campaigned 
in black churches in Norfolk, ’’because they're ail Democrats anyway*”
This had important ramifications for the Conservative Sect: while it
may attract a number of Protestants, the sect tended to cleave the 
Protestant community along racial lines, and it received very few non- 
Protestant votes. After the 1980 presidential election, in one "exit" 
poll, of more than 1*500 respondents, fifty-three percent of blacks 
questioned said they were "born again" and thirty-four percent of whites
9Q
said they were "born again*" Among the white "born again" respondents, 
Reagan beat Carter by about ten percent, the same margin of victory 
Reagan received in the total vote, but among black "born again" respon­
dents, Carter beat Reagan, eighty-six percent to six percent. This 
national poll tended to support Ralph's contention that blacks "are all 
Democrats anyway" regardless of their religious orientation.
Tabid Four shows the distribution of Nunnally/Ra1ph. votes by the 
respondents' religiousity. The striking similarity between Nunnally/ 
Ralph votes and the votes for all other candidates indicates it would be 
difficult to say religiousity was a factor in the election. Nunnally and. 
Ralph received a. higher percentage of their votes from thos who said they 
attended church at least once a month, and all other candidates received 
a higher:-percentage from those who said they rarely or never went to 
church. Other attempts were made to find significant differences in the
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Table Three* Re1ig io us Ident ific a1:ion by Vote.
Nun/Ral All Oth.
Religious Idenit if icat:Lona (N--48) (N=321
Protestant 86 5 9
Catholic 9 10
Jewish 0 “7f
Other, None 12 23
a. From the question, "Would you describe your religious orientation
as Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or something else?51
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votes east for individual candidtat.es, but the votes cast for Walker, 
Fitzpatrick, Babalas, and Oberndorf, were all within f ive-<'.percentage 
points of the distribution of their votes combined. Obviously, it was 
possible to say the Norfolk State Senate election was probably not 
decided by the religious devotion or habits of the respondents’ and 
this would tend to belie Nunnally* s and Ralph’s claim, expressed to the 
writer before the election, that they would pick up the votes of "all of 
the religious people in Norfolk."
All of the data presented so far strongly support the idea that 
the Norfolk election was a partisan affair,. Correlations of denomina­
tions— -Baptist, Methodist, etc.— by Nunnally/Ralph vote demonstrated 
there was no significant difference between their votes and the votes 
cast for the other candidates. Respondents were asked, "What is your 
reaction to Nunnally or Ralph, favorable, unfavorable, etc.?"— and, 
again, the only strongly favorable group among ten different groups 
(denominations, vote frequency, age, etc.) x<ras the group of Republicans 
in the survey; the only strongly unfavorable group was the group of 
Democrats in the survey.
Putting the best possible light on Nunnally* s and Ralph's loss, one 
could say they did poorly not because they had an unpopular message, 
rather, they did not reach enough people, especially the Independents and 
Democrats. It was clear from the survey that the respondents knew little 
about the pair. When respondents were asked if they heard or read any­
thing about the religious beliefs of the candidates, fifty-five percent 
said they had. Of this group, forty-seven percent douldn’t remember 
W'j! !,C S! uandldn to, I:wen ty~oao percent sni.d they had headd something about 
Oberndorf* s religion, seven percent mentioned Babalas or Fitzpatrick, and 
six percent mentioned either Nunnally or Ralph. The respondents were not
Table Four. Religious it)? by Vote.
Nun/Ral All Others
R e .11 g 1 o u a i t y (N=«48) ( N=* 321)
Would you describe 
yourself as...
Very Religious 25 29
Fairly Religious 48 48
Not Very Religious 11 10
Not At All 17 II
! U  > w  <■» ‘C L  s s d  i > y  v.) Li
a 11end chur ch:
Once a Week 31 33
At Least Once a Month 47 37
Few Times Year 16 12
Rarely, Never 6 18
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required to be accurate (e.g., Oberndorf was a Jew, Fitzpatrick was a 
Catholic) and the percentages would have been smaller if respondents 
were required to be accurate. Nonetheless, seventy-one percent of all the 
respondents (N-277) either did not know or could not remember the religious 
beliefs of any of the candidates. All of this may say something about 
the Nunnally/Ralph effort to campaign in churches;; perhaps they did not. 
speak in enough churches; perhaps the parishioners• Idid .notwote, pehhaps 
the parishioners did not pay attention to them.
Nunnally* s and Ralph * s lack of success in their church-based campaign 
was duplicated in Virginia by Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority during the 
1980 pretricUmtial campaign.., Although Falwell an id Moral Majority had 
registered many thousands of voters through church-based campaigns in 
Virginia, Joan Mahan, State Secretary of Board of Elections, said the 
increase in registrations in Virginia was due to population increases, 
and the State Chairman of the Virginia. Republican Party, Alfred Cramer, 
said, "I cannot find any evidence that Moral Majority and the evangelicals
O 1
really did anything like registering people."'6 Falwell * s boast that 
Moral Majority had registered three million voters nationwide had "little
f a c t u a .1. h a s i s " :
"though [Falwell] said the number is baseld on '.estimates from 
state affiliates, Moral Majority directors in two of the 
active states— California and Alabama-— said they merely send 
out voter materials to pastors and make no effort to keep a 
count of new registerants."22
Falwell also claimed his "Old Time Gospel Hour" reached twenty-five million
viewers each week, but the Nielson rating for his show put the number of
) O
viewers at 1.2 million. Religious broadcasting in general reaches a 
narrow audience and "tends to reach those who have already been reached
in the sense of already having formed association with religious institu™
9 /
tions."."4 Using any church, whether it be a local church or an "electronic
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church," as a political vehicle probably will not help a candidate much: 
either the candidate spends too much time reaching too few /people or the 
candidate is likely to persuade people who are already persuaded in his 
favor; in both cases, the candidate is engaged in unproductive pursuits. 
One question posed, in this study is whether conservative preachers can 
persuade people to act in a political manner, and the apparent answer 
here is the preacher does not reach many people and those he does persuade 
would have voted in favor of the preacher* s position anyway.
Table Five shows the correlation of the respondents * views about 
three types of religious involvement in politics by their vote. In each 
case, the. respondents who said they voted for Nunnally or Ralph were more 
likely to favor religious involvement. The Nunnally/Ralph voters were 
also somewhat less likely to be neutral, and the voters for all other 
candidates ware much more likely to be unfavorable toward, religious 
involvement..
The first question was intended to find out how the respondents felt 
generally about candidates expressing a religious belief,. What effect 
a candidates* religious expression might have was hard to say in this 
election—-but at the national level candidates commonly let it be known' 
that they are a Catholic, as in the case of the Kennedy brothers; "born 
again", as in the case of Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and John Anderson; 
it was difficult to think of a candidate who said he was an atheist. A 
candidate expressing his religious beliefs is. probably the mildest form 
of religious involvement in politics, and even though most candidates 
do it, it is interesting to note in this case study that a large percentage 
of the respondents were against it.
The second question in Table Five left a majority of respondents 
saying they did not know whether they would be more or less likely to
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Table Five. Religious Involvement by’Vote.
T y p e I nv o 1 v e m e n t
Nun/Ra.l
(N-48)
All Others 
<N=321)
Sho uld c and ida I: e s 
ma k e t he i r r el i g .1. o u s 
be I ie f s known.:
Yes 40 25
Neutral 29 36
No 30 40
More of less likely 
i: o vote f o r 'box n 
a g a i n Ch r i s t i an1 :
More Likely 19 0
Neutral 55 54
Less Likely 2.5 41
Should religious 
organizations be­
come politically 
involved s
Yes 22 y
Neutral 30 35
No 48 56
vote for a self-described "born again” Christian. Many tb.ld the writer 
something like, ”1 would have to know more about the candidate and 'his 
issues,,55 The greater number of negative responses than, positive responses 
among all voters, however, indicated a candidate might well be best 
advised to avoid saying things about his religion.
The third question spoke directly on the subject of this study, 
and even among those who voted for Nunnally or Ralph, a near majority 
were against religious organizations becoming involved in politics. The 
results strongly supported the view that even if conservative?- religious 
groups reached a larger number of people than they did, the candidates 
associated with these groups would probably be more likely to be hurt at 
the polls than helped. As for those who did vote for Nunnally and Ralph 
and were against religious institutions’ involvement,. this could be 
explained that either these respondents did not care about the involvement 
or they did not know about it; given the low recognition levels of the 
pair, the latter could be the case.
Table Six shows the ^ respondents’ views on involvement by their party 
identification and it shows a similarity between the votes cast- for 
Nunnally or Ralph and Republican identification, with one exception: 
respondents who said they were Republicans generally were much more likely 
to hold a negative view of religious organizations becoming involved in 
politics than Nunnally/Ralph voters specifically.
In Norfolk's Senate elections, a candidate must win the votes of 
large numbers of Democrats and Independents, and clearly a candidate who 
became associated with politically active religious organizations would 
tend to have trouble. Nonetheless, if a candidate of any description 
was associated with a religious organization, and if these percentages 
were reflective of the general population, such a candidate would probably
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lose.
Other polls support the contention that, association with religious
organizations is a dangerout activity for a candidate. Just prior to
the .1980 presidential election, the Virginia Republican Party polled
Republicans and found Jerry -Falwell had a "negative rating" of thirty-
two percent, the highest of any public figure mentioned, and while ten
percent said they would be more likely to vote for an "evangelical"
candidates thirty-one percent said they would be less likely, and
n Sfifty-three percent said it would have no - effect on their votek" An 
"exit" poll of over 1,500 voters nationally showed that among voters 
who described themselves as "born again Christians", sixty—one percent: 
said churches and religious organizations should not get involved in 
politics. Of these voters, four percent said they voted purposefully for 
the candidate endorsed by their clergyman, while seven- percent:isaicl they 
purposefully voted against their clergyman's candidate; eighty-seven 
percent said it made no difference.
Other polls, conducted by Gallup, indicated there was little 
national support for the issues agitated by the Conservative Sect. For 
example, seventy-eight percent of respondents said abortion should be the
woman’s choice or legal under certain circumstances, and a. plurality of
Republicans and majorities of Democrats and Independents said they supported
2 7the Equal Rights Amendment. Other Gallup polls indicated few voters—  
three percent— though'the "moral decline" of America was America1s most
Ofl
important problem.^
For Nunnally and Ralph, running on a church—based "moral" platform, 
there was .little change of success, indeed, if more voters had known 
about them, their vote totals might have been smaller. This case study 
is, of course, just a limited view of a. local state senate election, and
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one must be careful, in making generalizations about: its findings to the 
larger arena of political activity. What this case study does do., 
however, is give one an idea of how conservative religious candidates 
might carry out their campaign and how well they might fare.
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evening.
20. NBC/AP Exit Poll of 1,548 voters, the Associated Press,
14 November 1980.
21. Virginian-Pilot, 25 October 1980 U p. A~l.
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said they would not be likely to follow the political advice of their 
clergymen, while 10 percent said they would be likely to. Of the 55 
percent of the respondents who said they had heard of Moral Majority,
3 percent said they would follow its recommendations and 8 percent said 
they would vote against. News Release from University of Virginia.,
28 October 1980.
26. NBC/AP Poll, op. cit.
27. See Gallup Opinion Index, June, 1980. pp. 4, 7.
28 * Index, Ibid., in November, 1979, three percent said "moral"
issues were the most important problem; in April-May, I960, two percent 
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CONCLUSION
Many of the. commentaries on the .1980 elections referred to the ’’new” 
political Christians, or the "emerging” religions right, as if Jerry 
Falwell, Richard Zone, Paul Weyrich, et '.al, were the leaders of a brand 
new movement. .The "newness” of this "movement” is contradicted by the 
presence of conservative, politically minded preachers since the beginning 
of American political history— preachers like Jedidiah Morse, Billy 
Sunday, and Carl Mclntire. Whether the contemporary expressions of 
conservative sect protest— Moral Majority, Christian Voice, etc.— consti­
tuted a "movement” was also questionable; Hofstadter’s use of the word 
"style” was probably more appropriate because the Conservative Sect was 
always hampered in its political activities by its lack of cohesiveness, 
orderly selection of leaders, and its inability to agree on doctrine.
What it did share was a unique style,'
Protestantism inherently suffers of its own schismatic tendencies; 
the Conservative Sect, likewise, tends to cleave into sub-sects, and, in 
this, the Conservative Sect suffers politically because of its disorgani­
zation and inability to form coalitions. The associations it did form—  
with the "Federalist-Whig-Republican Party"— tended to be associations 
of convenience, based upon shared, narrow issues (e.g., anti-immigrant,
anti-communist, anti~homosexual. 1/
The religious roots of the Conservative Sect attracted the attention 
of people desirous of fundamentalist preaching, but, ironically, these 
roots limited the number of people who could join the sect, and, further
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tended to engender negative reactions among the groups of people left 
outside the sect’s separatist circle. The membership of the sect was 
limited to people who agreed to adhere to strict, fundamentalist dogma; 
unless the sect develops a theology to attract the flock of the much 
larger mainline churches (e.g., the Methodist and Catholic churches), it 
will be consigned to minority status, despite its claim, that it speaks 
for a majority of "moral” Americans. And, the groups of people left 
outside the sect: tend to react negatively: first, on theological grounds,
people outside the sect had a difficult time accepting that they were 
"immoral" or "sinful" merely because they did not interpret the Bible 
in the same way as the Conservative Sect. Second, outsiders tended to 
react negatively on political, grounds because they were fearful of a 
religious-political mix of any description. History tends to show the 
"founding fathers" were concerned about secular matters and crafted a 
constitution, accordingly, and indeed, the only mentions of religion 
(Article Six and the First Amendment) are negative commandments requiring
a. wide space between religion and government> lest one encroach upon the 
other. Poll data examined in the last chapter seemed to support the idea 
that many people still believe that secular matters are the first, priority 
of government and that religion and politics should remain separate.
Nonetheless, assume all of the above is mistaken— assume the Conserva­
tive Sect is a viable movement, attracts man}/ people by its theology, and 
few are worried about mixing politics and religion— -and the Conservative 
Sect still have a serious problem, to overcome before it gains major" 
political power, because its political rhetoric attempts to persuade 
people to undertake an impossible task,— -to legislate the reversal of 
certain social and. pol.iti.cal trends. If all legislation guaranteeing equal 
economic and political rights to women were repealed, would that quell
the feminist movement? If abortion and pornography were legislated out 
of existence, would they disappear? If homosexuality was harshly prose­
cuted, would there still be homosexuals? If the State required teachers 
to lead, prayers and inculcate students with the story of Genesis, would 
America be more moral?
Even if the -Conservative Sect accomplished its legislative goals it 
would find that government, as an instrument of morality, leaves much to 
be desired, as it is more suited to raising taxes, building roads, and 
making war, and politics is more suited to arguing about how to best 
accomplish these mundane, amoral tasks.
1,1. 11 s out' thing f:o r n clergy man to run for office (as many .have) 
and use liis robes as a part of his image; it is quite another thing for 
a clergyman to say his robes and his Bible are the reasons why hh- '.should 
be elected* that voters should believe God wants this clergyman -elected, 
and that this clergyman is on God* s side of the political issues-of the 
day. Senator Hatfield and President Carter wore their religion on their 
sleeves, but neither ever said, "Vote for me, I’m God’s choice *" On the 
other hand, Reverends Sunday, Mclntire, Falwell, Ralph, and others, each 
talked of what God really wants done (ban immigration, ban communism, 
ban homosexuality, etc.), and each urged voters to give them the clout 
to accomplish these tasks. The problem is, voting is not a religious 
duty, like saying prayers, reading the Bible, or keeping kosher, it is 
a civil responsibility.
While preachers and politicians are engaged in similar professions-—  
both need rhetorical skills, a devoted following, and a "cause"— data 
suggest the two professions mix poorly. A. preacher adept at soul-winning 
is not necessarily adept at winning votes, and by attempting to win votes. 
a preacher places at hazard his integrity and the moral strengths of his
church. Similarly, a politician who posits a political theology runs 
•the risk of losing more votes than he gains.
The Conservative Sect Is driven by social and political change. 
Assuming that society and politics will continue to change, there, will 
always be a Conservative Sect, ready to protest the changes,. The chanc 
of success for the Conservative Sect, however, ar.e likely to remain 
crniail»
APPENDIX
1. In the election for the State Senate in your district, the 
candidates were: Peter Babalas, Joseph Fitzpatrick, Wayne Nunnally,
William Ralph, Meyera Oberndorf, and Stanley Walker. You could vote 
for three. Do you recall for whom you voted?
(IF ANSWER IS "DEMOCRATS’*, ETC., PROBE THEM— "DO YOU RECALL WHICH 
CANDIDATES THOSE WERE?57)
BABALAS, FITZPATRICK, NUNNALLY, RALPH, OBERNDORF, WALKER
2. I'd like to ask you about the media coverage, of the election. 
How much information, did you receive from the following sources:
Newspapers:
A GREAT DEAL, SOME, VERY LITTLE, OR NONE 
Television:
A GREAT DEAL, SOME, 'VERY LITTLE, OR NONE 
Radio:
A GREAT DEAL, SOME, VERY LITTLE, OR NONE
Other organizations, like the PTA, League of Women Voters, etc.:
A GREAT DEAL, SOME, VERY LITTLE, OR NONE
Church or religious meetings:
A GREAT DEAL, SOME, VERY LITTLE, OR NONE
3. Do you recall having read or heard about the religious beliefs 
of the candidates: (IF YES, WHICH ONES?)
BABALAS, FITZPATRICK, NUNNALLY, RALPH, OBERNDORF, WALKER
4. In general, do you think candidates should make their religious 
beliefs known to the voters?
YES NO HO OPINION
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5. In general, would you be more or less likely to vote for a 
candidate who described himself as a "Bom Again Christian*'?
MORE LESS NO OPINION
6 . In general, do you believe churches or religious organizations
should or should not become involved in political campaigns?
SHOULD SHOULD NOT NO OPINION
7. I'd like to ask you about two of the candidates. First, Wayne
Nunnally, What have you heard about him?
(CODE RESPONSE) REPUBLICAN CHRISTIAN NO OPINION
Second,. William Ralph?
(CODE'RESPONSE) REPUBLICAN' CHRISTIAN NO OPINION
8. Would you describe '.your reaction to Wayne Nunnally as:
VERY FAVORABLE, FAVORABLE, UNFAVORABLE, VERY UNFAVORABLE, NO OPINION 
Would you describe your opinion of William Ralph as:
VERY FAVORABLE, FAVORABLE, UNFAVORABLE, VERY UNFAVORABLE, NO OPINION
9. Would you describe --your religious orientation as:
PROTESTANT, CATHOLIC, JEWISH, OR SOMETHING OTHER? (CODE CHRISTIAN)
(IF PROTESTANT,, WHICH DENOMINATION: ______ _________________ )
10. Do you describe yourself to be:
VERY RELIGIOUS„ FAIRLY RELIGIOUS, NOT VERY OR NOT AT ALL RELIGIOUS
11. How often would you say you attend church?
AT LEAST ONCE A WEEK, FEW TIMES A MONTH, FEW TIMES A YEAR, RARELY
12. Generally speaking, how much attention do you pay to politics?
A GREAT DEAL, SOME, NOT VERY MUCH, OR NONE
13. How often do you vote?
ALMOST ALWAYS, USUALLY, OCCASIONALLY, ALMOST NEVER, OR NEVER
14. In politics, do you generally consider yourself to be a: 
DEMOCRAT, REPUBLICAN, OR INDEPENDENT (CODE CHRISTIAN)
15. May I ask you your approximate age?
20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 plus
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16. What was the last year of formal education you received?
LESS THAN H.S. H.S. TECH DEGREE SOME COLLEGE ASSOCIATES BACHELORS 
MASTERS DOCTORAL 
1.7. Are you:
WHITE BLACK OTHER RACE
18. Sex (CODE RESPONSE)
F M
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INTERVIEWS, AND OTHER SOURCES
All of the interviews listed in the Chapter Notes were conducted by 
the author as a part of news stories that were broadcast on WNIS~AM, 
Norfolk, Virginia, where the author was News Director. Where indicated, 
interviews were conducted by 'telephone. All interviews were recorded and
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quoted comments were•transcribed from the tape.
There were many interviews conducted with all of the people, listed 
during the course of the political campaigns discussed in the text; dates 
and places are listed from interviews that were quoted.
INTERVIEWS
Ken Geroe. Telephone interview, 20 October 1979, and 6 November 1979,
Jones, Bob Sr. Jones gave a sermon at the Tabernacle Baptist Church, 
Virginia Beach, Virginia, 30 October 1980. Interviewed by author 
after the sermons
Phillips, G. Conoly. Telephone interview, 3 June 1978.
Teich, Albert. Telephone interview, 4 October 1979.
Thomas, Cal. Telephone interview, 29 October 1980.
Walker, Emily. Telephone interview, 5 September 1980.
The candidates mentioned in Chapter Five-*-Peter Babalas, Joseph
Fitzpatrick, R. Wayne Nunnally, Meyera Oberndorf, William. Ralph, and
Stanley Walker— were each interviewed several times personally and by
telephone by the author. Most of these interviews took place during
October 1979, and the first week of November 1979.
OTHER SOURCES
There is a nearly infinite amount of literature produced by conserva­
tive church organizations, and most of it has no publisher, no author, 
and no date. The author of this study contacted the The Christian 
Broadcasting Network, Virginia Beach, Virginia, and Moral Majority, 
Lynchburg, Virginia, and asked to become a member of their groups. Each 
week, at least, the author received literature in the form of brochures, 
articles, and fund-raising letters from these groups. It would be point­
less to list this literature because it is inadequately cited; further, 
the material measures a foot-thick and citations would run for many pages,
A scholar interested in this material should contact the religious 
organization*s public relations department, and should ask to be placed 
on their mailing list.
Another source of material on conservative religious organizations 
is their religious broadcasts over radio and television* Jerry Falwell* 
"Old Time Gospel. Hour”, Pat Robertsones "The 700 Club”, and Jim Bakker * s 
"P-T-L Club” are good sources. Transcripts of past shows are available 
from their respective public relations departments• The author spent 
many hours watching these shows, and gleaned a consid.era.ble amount of 
useable material from them.
One final source of primary material on the conservative religious 
organizations,, and their involvement in politics, is the American Civil 
Liberties Union and the. Anti~Defamation League. Both of these organiza­
tions provided a wealth of material.
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